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ABSTRACT
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND INCOME
INEQUALITY: MSA EVIDENCE FROM THE 1990s
Thomas Eric Lehman
August 2004
Employing a two-stage least-squares multiple regression technique using crosssectional data from metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) as the unit of analysis, this
study is designed to detect the indirect effect of skill-biased technological change (SBTC)
on household income inequality through changes in the rate of per capita economic
growth over the decade of the 1990s. Ifrecent technological changes are skill-biased and
tend to raise inequality, as much previous research has suggested, and if such
technological changes are a relatively large determinant of economic !"Yfowth, then we
should be able to observe a positive association between technology-driven economic
growth and income inequality, all else constant. However, the data and method
employed here could not establish support for this hypothesis. Instead, the measures of
technological change employed in this study are found to raise per capita economic
growth, but economic growth is found to decrease, not increase, household income
inequality.
In a related vein, this research study seeks to test the theory of an extended or
reformulated Kuznets Curve Hypothesis in which economic growth and income
inequality might be positively correlated due to structural changes in advanced post-
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industrial economies. This refonnulated Kuznets Curve Hypothesis is linked to the
theory that growth and inequality might both be related to SBTC resulting from structural
shifts away from a mature industrial economy and toward the emerging infonnation and
knowledge economy of the 1990s and beyond. This theory, too, must be rejected based
upon the findings presented here. Instead, economic growth is found to be negatively
correlated with changes in household income inequality in metropolitan areas over the
1990s, confinning the original Kuznets Hypothesis that rising economic growth
compresses the income distribution. Other variables are also found to explain variations
in household income inequality in metropolitan areas over the decade, including changes
in educational inequality, population growth rates, and changes in black-nonblack
housing segregation.
Overall, the findings presented here suggest that 1) further work must be done to
substantiate the SBTC explanation for rising income inequality, 2) the effects of
technological change may have little or no impact on inequality through economic
growth, 3) the original Kuznets Curve Hypothesis appears to hold true even during
periods of apparent structural change in an advanced post-industrial economy, and 4)
numerous additional factors not identified by this study must be responsible for the
variations in metropolitan household income inequality over the decade in question.
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CHAPTER I

Introduction
Background of the Research Question

The experience of the U.S. economy in the late 1990s marks something ofa
watershed episode in terms of the trends in economic growth and labor productivity. The
"productivity slowdown" of the 1973 to 1995 period, manifest in average annual
productivity growth ofless than two percent (see Wolff, 1985, 1996), was followed by a
"productivity revival" beginning in 1996 which saw GDP and labor productivity growth
climb to between three and four percent annually and as high as six or seven percent in
some quarters (U.S Department of Commerce, BEA, 2003; U.S. Department of Labor,
BLS, 2003). Rates of growth in real GDP also began to exceed trend-line expectations,
leading to an accelerated rise in real output per capita thought to be driven, in part, by
rapid technological advancements such as the PC and Internet "revolutions"
(Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000; Oliner & Sichel, 2000). Apparently, the impact of the
personal computer (finally) began to show up in the productivity and output numbers
(Stiroh, 2001a, 2001b).!
While labor productivity and economic growth figures began to exhibit marked
deviations from their secular trend, income inequality did not. The rise in income
inequality beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Levy & Murnane, 1992;

I See Gordon (2000) for an alternative less sanguine view of the role of information technology in raising
productivity and economic growth.
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Ryscavage, 1999) continued to increase, although at a less rapid pace (Autor, Katz &
Krueger, 1998; Card & DiNardo, 2002). The household Gini coefficient is one of the
most popular measures of income inequality (Ryscavage). According to Census Bureau
data, the mean household Gini coefficient for the majority of Metropolitan Statistical
Areas rose from .4291 in 1990 to .4429 in 2000, an increase of roughly 3.2 percent over
the decade. 2
Is there a relationship between economic growth and income inequality, and, if
so, what explains the direction of this relationship? The formal investigation into the
association between economic growth and income inequality began with Simon Kuznets'
(1955) classic article relating the level of inequality to phases of industrialization and
urbanization in various economies (specifically, Great Britain, Germany and the United
States). In that article, Kuznets argued that economic growth exerts a loose causation on
income inequality, and that at various stages of economic development (defined in terms
of industrialization and urbanization levels), inequality would initially rise and then
decline. This relationship came to be understood as the "Kuznets Curve Hypothesis,"
suggesting an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between economic growth and
income inequality. Kuznets claimed that in the early stages of industrialization and
urbanization, economic development would accompany rising inequality due to the high
returns to capital investment, earned largely by wealthy asset owners, and due to the

It should be noted that research suggests that the rate of increase in income inequality and the acceleration
in the wage gap beginning in the 1970s and 1980s began to subside somewhat during the 1990s (Card &
DiNardo,2002). Ryscavage (1999, p. 34) reports that the household income Gini for the entire United
States rose nine percent from 1979 to 1989, a much larger jump than the 1990-2000 period reflected in the
numbers reported above. Some research contends that this decline in the rate of increase in income
inequality was largely a result of tight labor markets and strong economic growth (see Autor, Katz &
Krueger, 1998). However, Hill and Wolman (1997a) challenge this theory at the level of the city-suburb in
metropolitan areas, finding that tighter labor markets may actually increase income inequality up to a point.
2

2

geographic shifts in households from rural to urban areas induced by industrialization and
economic growth. However, in the later stages of industrialization and urbanization
Kuznets argued that inequality would abate, and that the forces of economic growth
would exert downward pressure on inequality.
Since Kuznets' original article on the relationship between economic growth and
income inequality, numerous studies have sought to substantiate the Kuznets hypothesis
using cross-sectional or time-series data on various units of analysis ranging from
developing and developed economies (Adelman & Robinson, 1989; Aghion, Caroli &
Garcia-Penalosa, 1999; Anand & Kanbur, 1993; Barro, 2000; Chang, 1994; Galbraith &
Kum, 2002; Glomm, 1997; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Hasla2, Fomby & Slottje,
1988; Thornton, 2001; Vicente & Borge, 2000) to regional, state, or local economies
(Aigner & Heins, 1967; Al-Samarrie & Miller, 1967; Cloutier, 1997; Murray, 1969;
Panizza,2002). The results ofthese studies are mixed, and the findings are highly
sensitive to the unit of analysis, the specific measure of inequality, and the time period to
which the data apply. In particular, and relevant to the current study, the Kuznets
inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and growth appears to be evident in
developing economies (Adelman & Robinson; Haslag et al.; Greenwood and Jovanovic),
while an uninverted U-shaped relationship may exist for advanced developed economies
(Aghion et al.; Barro; Galbraith & Kum; Glomm; Vicente and Borge). That is, the
Kuznets relationship between inequality and growth appears to explain the behavior of
developing economies where industrialization and urbanization lead first to a rise and
then a decline in inequality. However, it fails to explain the more recent behavior of

Freeman (2003) finds that economic growth and the decline in unemployment toward the late 1990s were
linked with falling rates of poverty, but says nothing about the effects, if any, on changes in inequality.
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developed economies where economic growth (even when below its secular trend) seems
to be positively correlated with rising inequality, particularly since the late 1970s in the

u.s. (Levy & Murnane, 1992; Ryscavage, 1999).
Taken together, this line of research suggests that the Kuznets inverted U-shaped
curve can neither be fully rejected nor consistently confirmed. However, as Anand and
Kanbur (1993), Barro (2000) and Vicente and Borge (2000) suggest, when developed and
developing economies are analyzed in isolation from one another, different stages of the
Kuznets process can be observed. The Kuznets Hypothesis may apply differently to
different economies in different stages of economic development, and fitting the theory
neatly to a broad spectrum of diverse economies may not be possible.
Further, the formal Kuznets' Curve may represent only a single stage or single
oscillation in a long series of oscillations. That is, the initial curve proposed by Kuznets
in his 1955 article may represent only one period in the longer term trajectory of
economic growth, depending upon the stage of economic development exhibited by a
given economy. If this is the case, then we would expect to see both positive and
negative associations between economic growth and income inequality at various stages
in the growth and development process, as implied by the research conducted to date.
The implication for the original Kuznets Hypothesis is that the original proposed model
positing a single inverse U-shaped relationship between per capita growth and income
inequality needs to be extended or reconstructed. A reconstructed theory may included
multiple oscillating Kuznets Curves that rise and fall according to different stages of
industrialization-urbanization, post-industrialization and suburbanization, post-postindustrialization and post-suburbanization (whatever these might be), and so on.
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Another line of research into the relationship between economic growth and
income inequality, connected to the Kuznets Hypothesis, involves the role of what has
come to be known as "skill-biased technological change" (SBTC), particularly in
developed economies and particularly embodied in the adoption and use of the
microprocessor and personal computer (Autor, Katz & Krueger, 1998; Block, 2000;
Cappelli, 1996; Caselli & Coleman, 2001; Galor & Moav, 2000; Galor & Tsiddon, 1997;
Greenwood, 1999; Krueger, 1993; Levy & Murnane, 1996; Nakamura, 2000). Periods of
innovation and rapid technological change may lead to a higher demand for skilled labor
in order to understand, implement, use and maintain new technologies in production. As
the demand for skilled and educated labor rises, the returns to skill and education also
rise, widening the income gap between the skilled and the unskilled. In theory, the result
is that the increased pace of technological change raises the returns to human capital
while also (eventually) increasing economic growth, leading to a positive relationship
between growth and income inequality in developed economies.
Block (2000) and Nakamura (2000) argue that entrepreneurship and the "creative
destruction" of a dynamic capitalist market playa critical role in this process. As
entrepreneurial talent leads to innovations and technological breakthroughs, technologyled economic growth occurs simultaneous to a widening in the wage structure as
entrepreneurs and those with large amounts of human capital are rewarded for their
efforts, while those who possess human capital related to obsolete production methods
see their incomes decline. According to this theory, we would expect growth and
inequality to be positively correlated in advanced economies undergoing rapid
technological change.
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Greenwood (1999) offers an interesting theory suggesting that the adoption of
new technologies since the 1970s (and particularly microprocessor technologies) operates
with a lag relative to economic growth, and thus explains both the rise in income
inequality as well as the so-called "productivity slowdown" from roughly 1973 through
1994 (see also Wolff, 1996). As new technologies are developed, they take time to
understand, implement, and use in a way that will eventually (but not immediately) raise
labor productivity and economic output. However, new technologies also raise the
demand for skilled and educated labor, both during and after the adoption phase, so that
the returns to human capital increase, leading to a rise in the skilled-unskilled wage gap.
Intuitively, this is an inviting theory. Galor and Moav (2000) and Galor and Tsiddon
(1997) develop models that seem to confirm Greenwood's thesis: technological change
can have simultaneous effects on economic growth and income inequality, leading to
either a positive or negative association between growth and inequality depending upon
the pace and stage of technological adoption.
The recent decade of economic growth and rising income inequality during the
1990s, and particularly the 1995 to 2000 period, offers an interesting and inviting
backdrop for an empirical investigation into the relationship between economic growth
and income inequality. If the new technologies of the "information economy" lead to
both economic growth and growing income inequality, then economic growth and rising
inequality should be positively correlated. An empirical test of this "reconstructed"
Kuznets Hypothesis could be expected to reveal that income inequality is positively
associated with (and is a function of) technological change and economic growth, when
controlling for other plausible factors.

6

One of the problems encountered when attempting to empirically test this theory
on the intemationallevel (between countries) is the overall differences in the relevant
economies, even among developed and/or post-industrial nations. In particular, the
difficulty in finding a consistent and universal measure of inequality across various
developed and developing economies has proven difficult (Chang, 1994; Deininger &
Squire, 1997; Forbes, 2000; Galbraith & Kum, 2002), leading researchers to search for
regional or local units of analysis (Aigner & Heins, 1967; AI-Sarnarrie & Miller, 1967;
Cloutier, 1997; Panizza, 2002; Partridge, 1997). The degree of technological change may
be difficult to measure and compare across different economies, and the influence of
short-term business cycles impacts national economies at different times and to different
degrees. Further, the availability of data covering enough countries to provide the
minimum number of cases for a rigorous statistical analysis may be limited. As a
solution, the data limitations of a cross-country analysis of growth and inequality might
be partially overcome by utilizing city- or metropolitan-area data confined to a single
national economy, particularly the United States where data on metropolitan economies,
or MSAs, are widely available.

Thesis Statement of the Problem and Research Questions

The primary problem or question to be explored in the following research is to
investigate the degree to which technology-driven economic growth may be responsible
for rising household income inequality in the United States, especially during the
productivity and growth "revival" of the 1990s. Does economic growth in an advanced,
post-industrial economy (i.e., the United States) lead to rising income inequality via the
medium of SBTC? Might the 1990s experience be evidence of the beginning of a new
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Kuznets Curve where technological change, ceteris paribus, leads to a positive
association between economic growth and income inequality, even in advanced nations?
If so, this would help form the theoretical basis for a "reconstructed" Kuznets
Hypothesis, updated for post-industrial economies.
The primary thesis of the present research is that technological improvement leads
to exogenous and/or endogenous economic growth3 (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986; Solow,
1956, 1957), which in tum leads to rising household income inequality through the
mechanism of non-neutral, SBTC (Berman, Bound & Griliches, 1994; Berman, Bound &
Machin, 1998; Bound & Johnson, 1992; Galor & Moav, 2000; Johnson, 1997; Krueger,
1993; Murphy & Welch, 1993a; Siegel, 1999). Non-neutral, SBTC can he said to be
evident in new technologies that raise the productivity of (and thus demand for) highskilled educated labor, while reducing or leaving unchanged the productivity of (and
demand for) low-skilled labor, providing relatively high returns to human capital. Ifthis
theory is correct, we would expect to see 1) a positive association between some measure
of (skill-biased) technological change and per capita economic output, and, subsequently,
2) a positive association between per capita economic output and some measure of
income inequality.
The importance of this line of research is profound in terms of its implications for
public policies designed to address the perceived problem of income inequality. If
growth and income inequality are positively correlated because of the presence ofSBTC,
then public policies designed to temper the rise in inequality must take economic growth

3 For present purposes of investigating the effect of growth on inequality, it is not relevant to distinguish
between exogenous economic growth as suggested in the Solow Neoclassical growth model, or endogenous
economic growth as suggested by New Growth theorists such as Romer and Lucas. Whether technological
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into consideration. That is, public policies aimed at reducing inequality should also
encourage productivity and economic growth, rather than forcing an "equity-efficiency
tradeoff' between the two (Okun, 1975). If income inequality is a problem because of
the social and political conflicts it engenders, as suggested by some authors (Alesina &
Rodrik, 1994; Dieckmann, 1996; Furman & Stiglitz, 1998; Keefer & Knack, 2002;
Persson & Tabellini, 1994; Rodriguez, 2000), and if it is positively correlated with
growth, then a natural tension or dilemma exists in fashioning social policy designed to
reduce income inequality (Lindbeck, 1998). The question becomes one of dealing
carefully with income inequality that may be a function of technology-driven economic
growth, without damaging or retarding that growth. What types of social and economic
development policies may be adopted that help to promote (or at least preserve)
economic growth, which is theoretically good for everyone ("a rising tide lifts all
boats" {Freeman, 2003} ), and yet prevent a further widening of income inequality, which
could potentially wreak social and political conflict that in tum retards growth? This is a
particularly important question in light of the benefits that economic growth is found to
have, even on the poor (Dollar & Kraay, 2001; Lucas, 1988).
The present research proposes to accomplish three goals. First, to summarize and
critique the recent literature on wage and income inequality, and, more specifically,
review the possible theoretical arguments for the relationship between inequality and
economic growth that may arise due to SBTC. Second, to analyze 1990 and 2000 data on
u.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in order to investigate the possible
association between economic growth, technological change, and income inequality that

change affects economic growth exogenously or endogenously is not as important to this research as is the
effect of that change on the income structure.
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may have become apparent in this data over the decade of the 1990s. The dominant
theory that will be tested is the degree to which technological change may spur economic
growth, while also leading to rising labor market and household income inequality. If
this is the case, we would expect to see a positive association between economic growth,
as a function of technological change, and a concomitant widening of inequality.
The use of data from the 1990s is particularly interesting in that this period
witnessed a revival in productivity and economic growth, even as income inequality was
thought to rise over most of the decade. The comparison of 1990 and 2000 MSA growth
and inequality data will be a critical contribution of this paper. Because of the
consistency, relative accuracy, and comparability of the data across a single homogenous
developed economy, and because of the number of cases made possible by using MSAs
as the unit of analysis, this study will fill an important gap in the literature on the growthinequality relationship.
A final goal will be to suggest policy recommendations that flow logically from
the findings, and which may serve to both lessen the potential for social conflict
stemming from inequality while also encouraging long-term economic growth and
development. The key will be to develop social policy that deals carefully with
inequality while preserving or even enhancing the prospects for economic growth and
development (see Lindbeck, 1998).

Assumptions and Limitations of the Study

One of the dominant themes in the growth-inequality literature assumes that
causation runs not from growth to inequality, as implied by Kuznets, but rather runs in
the reverse direction, from inequality to growth. Based upon a "median voter" theory of
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political behavior, this line of research argues that growth in subsequent periods is a
function of the level of inequality in previous periods, and that the sign on the coefficient
is negative, meaning that the higher the level of initial inequality in income and wealth,
the slower is the subsequent period of per capita growth (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994;
Dieckmann, 1996; Furman & Stiglitz, 1998; Keefer & Knack, 2002; Persson & Tabellini,
1994; Rodriguez, 2000). The "median voter" theory of political behavior implies that if
the income of the median voter coincides with the income of the mean voter (a "bell
curve" income distribution), the median voter will prefer non-redistributive policies that
enhance per capita economic growth. On the other hand, if the median voter is poorer
than the mean voter (the income distribution is positively skewed and thus more
unequal), then the median voter will prefer a progressive tax on investment designed to
redistribute income and wealth through higher transfer payments, which may lead to
slower per capita economic growth in some subsequent period. The greater the initial
level of inequality, then, the more likely that the median voter will be in the lower half of
the income distribution, and the higher the probability that he or she will vote for a
redistribution of wealth and income from the top quintiles of the income distribution.
Thus, inequality in wealth and income is argued to be negatively correlated with
subsequent economic growth because inequality is conducive to the adoption of growthreducing public policies.
Several studies have countered or modified the "median voter" theory in the
growth-inequality literature, arguing instead that initial levels of inequality may be
unrelated to growth in subsequent periods (Forbes, 2000; Partridge, 1997), positively
correlated with growth in subsequent periods (Li & Zou, 1998; Sylwester, 1999,2000),
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or that the growth-inequality relationship is indetenninate depending upon the dominance
of opposing effects (Lee & Roemer, 1998). In particular, these authors have challenged
the assumption, implied by the "median voter" theory, that unequal income distribution
has no impact on political participation, and that political participation is equal even
when the income distribution is not. This is rarely the case. If income and political
participation are positively correlated, then the political participation oflower-income
voters is relatively less than that of higher-income voters, meaning that the median voter
with relatively low income may have little if any impact on public policies or the
distribution of income as detennined by the political process. 4
The assumption made hy all of these studies is that causation runs from inequality
to growth, and that initial levels of inequality may explain subsequent periods of
economic growth and development. The assumption in the present research is just the
opposite: economic growth exerts causation on income inequality, linked, as suggested
above, through the mechanism of SBTC. This is not to argue that causation could not run
in the opposite direction. However, one of the weaknesses in this line of research is the
mixture of developed and developing economy data. Initial levels of inequality may lead
to slower subsequent growth in developing economies, but the relationship may be just
the opposite in developed economies, leading to mixed results (see especially Forbes,
2000, and Partridge, 1997).
Further, it has been shown that in spite of the relatively high levels of income
inequality that prevail in the United States, social and political tolerance for inequality in
the United States seems to be much higher than elsewhere (Austen, 1999; Konow,

4 One recent study goes even further, suggesting that there is little if any difference between democratic and
nondemocratic political regimes in terms of redistribution levels and policies designed to address issues of
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2003).5 If this is the case, then the inequality-to-growth direction of causation assumed
by the "median voter" theory is likely to have very weak effects and is not likely to apply
in the United States. The statistical methodology utilized in the present research will
attempt to test for endogeneity between inequality and economic growth using a twostage least-squares regression model. This approach will permit us to investigate whether
growth is endogenous to inequality in U.S. metropolitan economies, indirectly testing the
median voter theory of income distribution.
The assumptions in the present research, then, are that 1) inequality is a function
of technology-driven economic growth, and not vice versa, and 2) the results of the
research may be generalized to developed economies (particularly the Unitr:'d States), but
not necessarily to developing economies. The effect of inequality on economic growth
will be tested using a two-stage least-squares regression model and Hausman's (1976)
specification test for endogeneity.
A final, separate, assumption in the present research is that inequality, per se,
should not be viewed as a problem, in and of itself (Welch, 1999). That is, the relative
income levels of individuals and households, and the distribution of income, are not seen
as being as important as the real purchasing power and standards of living of those same
individuals and households as represented in measures of per capita economic output
(Block, 2000; Feldstein, 1998). For example, if the income distribution is widening as a
result of the top income quintile or top decile realizing more rapid income gains than the

inequality (Mulligan, Gil, & Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
In fact, Konow (2003) shows that inequality may be the nonnative condition preferred by a majority of

5

people when the factors leading to inequality can reasonably be expected to be controlled by individuals
themselves. In a summary of the literature on justice theories, Konow reveals that survey respondents are
willing to tolerate relatively high levels of inequity when the choices leading to this inequity are
attributable to the effort (or lack thereot) made by the parties in consideration.
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middle or lower quintiles or deciles, this does not mean that absolute poverty is rising,
per se. Increases in inequality do not necessarily cause increases in poverty (Freeman,
2003). What matters is that the overall level of productivity, economic output and per
capita growth move in the upward direction, and that the institutional framework of
voluntary exchange embodied in a market economy is allowed to function. The standard
of living, regardless the variance of the income distribution, can then be assumed to raise
the living standards for the majority of the population, and income inequality, per se, is
not necessarily detrimental for those at the bottom end of the income distribution. 6
On the other hand, income inequality can and does become problematic when the
social and political tolerance for it begins to wane, and when it leads to social conflict or
political outcomes that threaten to retard or depress economic growth. As suggested by
Austen (1999), we have apparently not yet reached this point in the United States.
However, it is not inconceivable that if inequality continues to rise in the future as it
seems to have risen since the 1970s, we could reach the point where it becomes socially
and politically intolerable, even in the United States. The message in the present
research, then, is one of explaining the possible causes behind that rise in inequality, and
in finding policy outlets for those who wish to address the concern of rising inequality
without simultaneously harming the potential for economic growth.
In brief, the findings of the present analysis provide evidence that while
technological change is positively correlated with economic growth, economic growth
tends to reduce, not increase, income inequality. In the method employed here, the

No nonnative statement is being made about the desirability or undesirability of inequality. See Rawls
(1971). However, there is compelling evidence that real incomes at the bottom of the distribution have
stagnated or dropped while those at the top have risen over the past two decades (Gottschalk, 1997; Levy &
Murnane, 1992; Murray & Welch, 1992).
6
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theory that skill-biased technology-driven economic growth increases income inequality
could not be supported. Further, evidence of an extended or reconstructed Kuznets Curve
could not be found. The negative association found between measures of economic
growth and income inequality, controlling for other factors, lends support for the original
Kuznets Hypothesis. As economic growth and development improve, income inequality
appears to decline, all else constant. These findings also challenge theories and previous
research that focus on SBTC as an explanation for rising income inequality. If SBTC is
to be empirically linked with rising income inequality in the United States over the
1990s, evidence for this relationship will need to pursue avenues of research other than
those investigated here. In a recent paper, Card and DiNardo CWO?) also question the
explanatory power of the SBTC theory of rising wage and income inequality, pointing
out that wage and income inequality began to stabilize in the 1990s even as technological
change continued to accelerate. One explanation for this may be that technological
change has become less skill-biased and more skill-replacing in recent years, particularly
as personal computers and other technological advancements have become more "user
friendly." If so, this would tend to (moderately) reduce the relative demand for skilled
over unskilled labor, restraining the rise in wage and income inequality.
In the following section, I provide a detailed summary of the previous literature
on the relationship between technological change, economic growth, and income
inequality. Beginning with the work of Kuznets (1955), theoretical and empirical
research pertaining to the growth-inequality relationship is discussed, followed by an
investigation of the technology-growth relationship stemming from Solow (1956, 1957).
These two strands of research are then linked theoretically by a discussion of the more
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recent studies on the relationship between SBTC and rising income inequality. Part III
introduces the theoretical model that will be used to test the relationship between
technological change, economic growth and income inequality, followed by a discussion
of the research methodology, data, and statistical technique to be employed. Part IV
provides a detailed summary of the data and the statistical findings, and Part V offers
conclusions, policy recommendations and suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER II

Literature Review: Growth, Technological Change, and
Inequality
The thesis of the following research rests on three primary assertions relating
growth, technological change, and inequality. The first is that growth and inequality may
be positively or negatively correlated, depending upon the level of economic
development exhibited by a given economy. Growth may impact or correlate with
inequality differently at different points in the development process. This assertion
builds upon the original work by Kuznets (1955), and makes predictions about the
relationship between growth and inequality based upon the level of development and the
pace of technological change. The second assertion is the relatively simple and wellknown idea that technological improvements encourage per capita economic growth
(Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986; Solow, 1956, 1957). The third assertion is critical to the
main thesis and ties the first two assertions together to form the basis upon which the
primary hypothesis rests: non-neutral, skill-biased technological change (SBTC) may
explain any observed positive relationship between growth and inequality in developed
economies. This assertion derives from the research on SBTC and inequality, and ties
this literature to the growth-inequality relationship. The structure and format of the
literature review follows the sequence and logic of these three primary assertions.
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The Growth-Inequality Relationship

In his 1955 article, Simon Kuznets made the argument that the direction of
causation between inequality and growth ran from growth to inequality. That is, the
stages of industrialization and urbanization (Kuznets' definition of "economic
development") determined or influenced the level of inequality. More specifically,
Kuznets posited an inverse V-shaped curvilinear relationship between these two
variables. He suggested that in the early stages of industrialization and urbanization,
economic development accompanied rising inequality. This was so for several reasons.
According to Kuznets, high rates of return to capital investment during periods of rapid
industrial growth lead to a widening gap between labor and the owners of capital
(physical or financial). In addition, high rates of migration and urban population growth
lead to greater inequality. According to Kuznets, because urban populations tend to
exhibit greater income disparity than rural populations, migration of labor from rural to
urban areas ("urbanization") would lead to an increase in the size of the population with
the greatest inequality (the urban sector) and a concomitant reduction in the size ofthe
population with the least inequality (the rural sector). Inequality would thus increase due
to demographic shifts induced by economic growth. Finally, an underlying assumption in
the Kuznets Hypothesis (more or less dormant in the 1955 article) is that urban labor
markets exhibit higher levels of skill disparity than rural markets, thus leading to what
more recent investigators have labeled "skill-biased" inequality (Bound & Johnson, 1992;
Johnson, 1997; Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce, 1993; Levy & Murnane, 1992; Murphy &
Welch, 1993b).
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In the later stages of industrialization and urbanization Kuznets argued that
inequality would abate, and that the forces of economic growth would exert downward
pressure on inequality. The continued increase in the supply of more highly skilled urban
labor would compress wages and generate a more egalitarian income distribution. In
addition, the high rate of turnover in a dynamic capitalist economy would lead to a high
frequency of income mobility, in tum lowering inequality through Schumpeterian
"creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 1976). Kuznets further argued that urban social
policy would evolve to mitigate the effects of inequality. Particularly, social institutions
would be forced to change in order to address the problem of growing inequality in an
industrialized and urbani'7d economy under democratic capitalism. In, :ome taxes would
become more progressive, and social redistribution policies would become more popular,
thus creating a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and income (Kuznets, 1955).
Given the time period in which Kuznets' article was written and published (1955),
it is not difficult to understand why he reached these conclusions. In analyzing the
predominantly developed economies of the United States, United Kingdom, and
Germany, Kuznets observed economies coming to full industrial maturity at a time when
the wage disparity was declining. As Goldin and Margo (1992), and Margo (1999)
conclude, the wage structure during the 1940s and 1950s was narrowing during a period
of rapid economic development. There were two predominant reasons for this in the
United States, according to Goldin and Margo. First, the supply of skilled labor was
rising due to the "high school movement:" the concerted social push for children to
complete four full years of high school. The increased supply of high-school graduates
had the effect of reducing the wage disparity between high-skilled labor (i.e., high school
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graduates) and low-skilled labor (i.e., those with less than a high school diploma). A
simple supply and demand analysis illustrates that as high-skilled labor became more
abundant relative to low-skilled labor, the wages of high-skilled labor were pushed down
and the wages of low-skilled labor rose, leading to income convergence.
Secondly, the outbreak of World War II had the effect of increasing the demand
for low-skilled labor relative to high-skilled labor, particularly in war-related production
industries, further compressing the overall wage structure. However, even after the war,
the wage structure remained stable and inequality was fairly subdued. Goldin and Margo
(1992) argue that further industrialization, in combination with the G.!. Bill, raised the
supply of educated and skilled labor, keeping wage disparities to a minimum on into the
1960s and 1970s, just as Kuznets had predicted. It is for this reason that Goldin and
Margo refer to this period as the "Great Compression" in the wage structure. Margo
(1999) argues that prior to this period, and during the earlier stages of U.S.
industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th century, wage inequality was much higher,
owing to the greater demand for skilled labor arising from the introduction of new
industrial technologies and mass production techniques.
These empirical findings seem to at least partially support the Kuznets Hypothesis
that inequality will tend to decline as industrialization and urbanization occur in
developed economies. On the other hand, the Kuznets curve, at least in its original form,
appears not to have fared well in light of the more recent empirical evidence indicating
rising inequality in the United States since at least the 1970s. Inequality in the United
States did indeed decline during the first half of the 20th century (Goldin & Margo, 1992).
However, beginning in the 1970s and accelerating into the 1980s, inequality began rising
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dramatically (Berman et al.,1994; Bound & Johnson, 1992; Hyclak, 2000; Johnson, 1997;
Juhn, Murphy & Pierce, 1993; Krueger, 1993; Levy & Murnane, 1992; Murphy &
Welch, 1992, Murphy & Welch, 1993a, 1993b; Ryscavage, 1999). The more recent rise
in inequality in the United States and, to a lesser degree, in other advanced industrial
economies (Acemoglu, 2002b; DeNardi, Ren & Wei, 2000; Galbraith & Kum, 2002),
leaves the original Kuznets Curve Hypothesis without firm empirical support. If
inequality is predicted to decline in the advanced stages of economic growth, as Kuznets
argued, then why do we seem to observe a marked widening in income inequality in the
most advanced economies (Nickell & Bell, 1996), and particularly the United States
(Gottschalk, 1993, 1997; Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997)? Galbraith and Kum (2002)
find confirmation for the original Kuznets Hypothesis across industrializing economies
even as they find a worldwide trend toward rising inequality within nations. They argue
that the rise in inequality is (mostly) independent of per capita GDP growth, and results
instead from the independent effects of separate factors.
An alternative explanation, however, is that the original Kuznets Hypothesis was

merely a description ofthe growth-inequality relationship at a precise period of economic
development, specifically the period evidenced by the shift from a primarily agrarian and
rural economy and culture to a primarily industrial and urban economic base.
These results could explain why inverted U-shapes prevailed using either
old time-series [from developed economies] or LDCs [less developed
countries] cross-sections, while uninverted U-shapes appear using recent
data for developed economies. Kuznets' original hypothesis was
formulated for a specific and unfinished growth process, whereas new
data may be referred either to the end of that process or to new processes.
That is why empirical studies on the inequality-growth relationship should
specify which processes and which phases are being studied (Vicente &
Borge, 2000, p. 500; italics added).
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The implication is that the original Kuznets Hypothesis may apply differently to different
economies in different stages of economic development, and fitting the theory neatly to a
broad spectrum of diverse economies may not be possible. While Galbraith and Kum
(2002) find general confirmation of the original Kuznets process, even they suggest that
the growth-inequality relationship may reverse itself in the richest countries, with a
turning point at some high level of income or per capita growth. Thus, in analyzing a
developed economy entering a post-industrial period of growth, we may need to recast
the Kuznets Curve into a broader theory that allows for multiple oscillating "waves" that
reveal either a positive or negative association between inequality and growth depending
upon the specific stage of economic development or technological advancement.
Research seeking to test the Kuznets Hypothesis suggests the need to apply the
theory carefully depending upon the level and stage of economic development exhibited
by given economies. Haslag, Fomby and Slottje (1988) tested the Kuznets Hypothesis on
time-series data from the Mexican economy from 1951 through 1978. They find
convincing evidence that 1) the direction of causation between inequality and growth
runs from growth to inequality, as suggested by Kuznets, and 2) at early stages of
economic development, inequality is higher, and at later stages of economic
development, the Mexican economy exhibits lower levels of inequality. 7 Specifically, the
authors find that a permanent one percentage point increase in Mexican per capita real
GDP leads to a permanent decrease in the Gini coefficient measure of expenditure
inequality, confirming the Kuznets Hypothesis that at higher stages of economic growth,

A key distinction of this study was the measure of inequality used. Instead of a more traditional measure
of income inequality, the authors employed a Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient measuring consumption
inequality. The authors believed this measure to be superior to the more traditional income Gini, and to
provide a more realistic reflection of the inequality in living standards not captured by income alone.
7
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inequality tends to decline. The weakness in this research is that it cannot be generalized
beyond the Mexican economy, or beyond a similar developing economy at the same stage
of development experienced by the Mexican economy between 1951 and 1978.
In a meta-analysis of the Kuznets Hypothesis, research findings reviewed by
Adelman and Robinson (1989) confirm the Kuznets theory, at least for noncommunist
developing economies between 1960 and 1980. The trends found by Adelman and
Robinson indicate that in spite of rising inequality during this period in developing
economies, the proportion of the households below the poverty line had been reduced.
The authors conclude that economic growth in developing economies is positively
correlated with rising inequality in the early stages of development, at least partially
confirming the Kuznets Curve theory.
Anand and Kanbur (1993) test the Kuznets Hypothesis using cross-sectional data
on sixty developing economies, employing six different measures of inequality to test for
a relationship between the income distribution and economic development. When the
sixty different countries are aggregated together, Anand and Kanbur find that all their
measures of inequality are statistically insignificant, and that the coefficients reflect both
positive and negative signs, suggesting no consistent direction of association between
inequality and economic growth. Thus, when the data are aggregated, the authors cannot
confirm the Kuznets Hypothesis. They are quick to point out, however, that their
findings do not permit a rejection of the Kuznets theory, but instead suggest that different
countries are at different stages along the growth-inequality continuum, and when data
are aggregated across economies, the Kuznets Curve fails to fit the data. Anand and
Kanbur, while failing to find a Kuznets Curve in their aggregated data, develop
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extensions of the Kuznets model to show that growth and inequality levels may vary at
different points in the growth process, so that a modified Kuznets Hypothesis may indeed
be plausible.
In another meta-analysis, Glomm (1997) finds convincing evidence that the
Kuznets "process" exhibits a different direction of association between growth and
inequality depending upon the time period and stage of economic development from
which the data are taken. When data are taken from Post-WWII periods in developed
economies, the Kuznets Curve appears to be uninverted, or right-side up, according to
Glomm: as economic growth progresses, inequality first declines, then rises. But, when
more recent data is taken on developing economies, the l( uznets Curve appears inverted,
or upside-down, as predicted by Kuznets original theory: as economic growth progresses,
inequality first rises, then declines. According to Glomm, then, the empirical evidence
on the Kuznets Hypothesis is simply too varied and mixed to elevate the Kuznets Curve
to the status of a "stylized fact." Glomm is one of the first authors to at least implicitly
suggest the possibility of rising and falling levels of inequality over time based upon
technological changes and subsequent migrations from one industrial sector to another,
i.e., oscillating Kuznets Curves.
Barro (2000) draws similar conclusions to those suggested by Glomm. In an
analysis of 84 countries with at least one comparable measure of inequality, Barro finds
that the growth-inequality relationship is different depending upon the level of per capita
GDP exhibited by the economy. For low GDP per capita countries, the association
between inequality and growth is negative. However, in high GDP per capita countries,
the association is positive. Barro concludes that the estimated relationship between
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growth and inequality found along an estimated Kuznets Curve reflects not just the
influence of per capita GDP, but also reflects a dynamic effect related to the adoption of
new technology, which may then have a transitory, Kuznets-like effect on the distribution
of income. We would expect to see just this type of effect if the adoption of new
technology is non-neutral or skill-biased.
Aghion et al. (1999), List and Gallett (1999), Thornton (200 I) and Vicente and
Borge (2000) all make similar diagnoses, implied or explicit, regarding the behavior of
the Kuznets Curve over time. The growth-inequality relationship does not exhibit a onetime consistent single pattern that fits all nations, but rather applies differently to different
nations at different points in time. A common theme in this body of research is that the
original Kuznets Curve may potentially reverse course in developed economies,
exhibiting a positive relationship between growth and inequality, particularly if SBTC is
present. List & Gallett, in particular, explicitly argue that the positive relationship
between growth and inequality that they find is a result of structural shifts in advanced
economies away from industrial manufacturing towards a post-industrial service and
professional economic base. However, the uncertainty and inconsistency surrounding
much of the data, and the difficulty in comparing international data sets (Deininger &
Squire, 1997; Galbraith & Kum, 2002), makes any conclusion tentative at best. For this
reason, research using consistent data from a single homogenous developed economy
such as the United States may be a better method of testing the Kuznets Hypothesis.
The earliest tests of the Kuznets Hypothesis using U.S. state data were conducted
by Aigner and Heins (1967) and AI-Samarrie and Miller (1967). Comparing state-level
data from the 1950 and 1960 censuses, both sets of authors find that higher levels of
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economic development and economic growth are correlated strongly with declining
inequality in the United States. In one ofthe first studies to test the Kuznets Hypothesis
using data from Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Murray (1969) confirms the state-level
findings of Aigner and Heins, and Al-Sammarie and Miller. Using MSA census data
from 1960, Murray finds an inverse relationship between economic growth and inequality
across U.S. cities, thus supporting the original Kuznets theory that inequality declines in
the later stages of economic development. The research findings from this particular
economic period in the U.S. are interesting in that they support the later findings by
Goldin and Margo (1992) concluding that the U.S. economy passed through a period of
th

rising equality and income compression during the middle of the 20 century, owing
largely to institutional and demographic factors. What Aigner and Heins, Al-Sammarie
and Miller, and Murray may have been picking up was the negative growth-inequality
correlation observed during the peak of manufacturing-based industrialization in the
United States.
A mature industrial economy such as the United States in the 1950s, perhaps on
the threshold of a technological revolution which might bring about large structural
changes, could be expected to exhibit the predicted negative relationship between growth
and inequality posited by the original Kuznets Curve. However, if technological change
can bring about a change in the direction of the growth-inequality relationship, then we
might expect the relationship between inequality and growth to exhibit a positive sign in
some subsequent period. Using cross-sectional data on MSAs from the 1980 and 1990
censuses, Cloutier (1997) finds a curvilinear relationship between inequality and
economic development that first declines and then rises. Using the squared value of
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median family income as the measure of economic development, Cloutier shows that as
median income rises, income inequality initially decreases at a declining rate, but then
begins to rise, indicating a positive growth-inequality relationship beyond a given level of
development. This seems to confirm a "turning point" in the growth-inequality
relationship in a developed economy, leading to a period of rising growth accompanied
by rising inequality.
Several weaknesses plaguing Cloutier's study, however, make this conclusion
somewhat tenuous. Cloutier's use of median family income as an operational definition
of economic development, while consistent with the previous work by Aigner and Heins
(1967), and Murray (1969), may not be the most accurate reflection of economic growth
or total economic output. Some measure of per capita output, such as per capita Gross
State Product or Gross Metropolitan Product, would seem to be a more accurate measure
of true economic growth. Further, Cloutier uses no measure oftechnological change, per
se, and does not test for the possibility that technological change may be "lurking" behind
the turning point in the growth-inequality relationship. These are weaknesses upon
which the present study hopes to improve.
Finally, a recent study by Wheeler (2004), also conducted using a sample of
metropolitan areas as units of analysis, explores the relationship between three separate
and distinct measures of urban economic growth (population, employment, and per capita
income) and a variety of measures of income inequality between 1970 and 1990.
Wheeler finds a negative relationship between all measures of urban growth and
inequality, implicitly confirming the original Kuznets Hypothesis over the span of these
two decades in the U.S. That is, metropolitan economies with a more rapid pace of
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economic growth and development from 1970 to 1990 also generally experienced a
smaller increase or a larger decrease in measured inequality. However, like Cloutier
(1997), Wheeler does not investigate the possibility of SBTC as a determinant of changes
in metropolitan inequality, nor does he employ a measure of economic growth based
directly upon per capita metropolitan output. Again, the present study seeks to extend
this research by linking the Kuznets process with SBTC, and to provide updated results
covering the decade of the 1990s.

The Technology-Growth Relationship
The relationship between technology and economic growth has a rich history.
That technological advancements help to promote economic growth has been largely
taken for granted by economists since the formal introduction of the discipline by Adam
Smith. The general concept is that new technologies, either by themselves or embodied
in new physical capital, raise the marginal product oflabor (the additional output gained
by the employment of an additional laborer) and thus increase output, thereby
accelerating economic growth. The idea that technology and growth are interrelated is
taken as a more or less "stylized fact" in the field of economics. 8

In his groundbreaking work on economic growth, Robert Solow (1956) sought to
improve upon the Harrod-Domar model of economic growth that emerged during the
1940s. The Harrod-Domar theory of economic growth argued that the output growth in
an economy was always precariously positioned on a "knife edge" where any deviation

8 For an interesting and easily readable discussion of technological change and global economic growth
since the Industrial Revolution, see Robert E. Lucas (2004). Lucas explains global changes in economic
growth and worldwide inequality as a function of the linkages between technological change, the returns to
human capital, and fertility rates, suggesting that the explanatory power of competing theories of growth
depend critically on the behavior of these factors.

28

between the growth rate of the labor force and the growth rate of capital accumulation
would throw the economy into a protracted period of slow or negative growth. With the
assumption that "fixed proportions" of capital and labor cannot be substituted for one
another, the Harrod-Domar model implies that the aggregate market economy is fragile
and susceptible to "stalling out" if the growth rates of capital and labor are not equal,
giving way to rising inflation or prolonged unemployment. In his path-breaking 1956
article, Solow argued that if the assumption of "fixed proportions" of capital and labor is
relaxed, and the assumption made that capital and labor are substitutable, then the longrun economy can easily reach a "steady state" rate of growth and not be so susceptible to
chronic bouts of unemployment or inflation. By demonstrating a positive relationship
between per capita output and the capital-to-Iabor ratio, with the assumption of
diminishing returns, Solow was able to revolutionize the field of economic growth by
introducing the now-standard Aggregate Production Function that forms the basis for
neoclassical growth theory.
In a follow-up article, Solow (1957) sought to build on his original theory by
exploring more specifically the effects of technological change upon economic growth.
Solow argued that "neutral" technological change would serve to shift the aggregate
production function upward, thus increasing output per capita at any given capital-tolabor ratio. The critical link between Solow's 1957 article and the present paper is
Solow's introduction of the concepts of "neutral" and "non-neutral" technological
change. According to Solow, "[s]hifts in the production function are defined as neutral if
they leave marginal rates of [technical] substitution [between capital and labor]
untouched, but simply increase or decrease the output attainable from given inputs"
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(1957). In modem tenns, "neutral" technological change would not change the
diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution between capital and labor along the
conventional isoquant line; the slope of the isocost line (the finn's budget constraint)
remains constant, and new technology simply shifts the isocost line outward to a higher
isoquant. That is, "neutral" technological change does not change the ratio of capital to
labor, but applies equally to each and proportionately raises the productivity of each.
Although Solow does not offer a specific definition, the reader is left to conclude
that "non-neutral" technological change would cause changes in the marginal rate of
technical substitution between capital and labor, and even, possibly, between different
tYr~s

of capital or d,fferent types oflabor. The introduction of "non-neutral"

technological change, then, would presumably change the capital-to-Iabor ratio, raising
the marginal productivity of one over the other. Further, and more specifically relevant
to the current research, some types of "non-neutral" technology may raise the
productivity of certain types oflabor, say, high-skilled labor, while leaving the
productivity of other less skilled labor either unchanged or marginally lower.
It is this notion of "non-neutral" technological change introduced by Solow that is

critical to the present research. If technological change drives economic growth in a
positive direction, but, at the same time, is non-neutral in a manner that differentially
affects the productivity of different types oflabor, then we could theoretically observe a
positive relationship between economic growth and income inequality.

The Technology-Inequality Relationship
Various authors and researchers have together suggested several dominant factors
that seem to explain the nationwide rise in inequality since the 1970s. Tinbergen (1975)
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has described rising inequality as a race between the supply of skilled labor and the
demand for skilled labor. To the extent that the demand for skilled labor outpaces the
supply, inequality will tend to accelerate. New technology that accelerates the demand
for skilled and educated labor in excess of supply would thus lead to rising inequality.
By far the most dominant theory that has emerged to explain the rise in inequality in the
United States since the 1970s is based upon the concept of non-neutral skill-biased
technology change (Acemoglu, 2002a; Berman et aI., 1994; Bound & Johnson, 1992,
1995; Goldin & Katz, 1996, 1998; Johnson, 1997; Juhn, et aI., 1993; Juhn & Murphy,
1995; Kiley, 1997; Krueger, 1993; Murphy & Welch, 1993a, 1993b; Siegal, 1999).
This theory rests on the notion that technological advancements are not neutral
and do not have the same productivity impact on all types oflabor. Rather, recent
technological innovations (and especially the microprocessor and the personal computer)
are particularly well-suited for an educated and skilled labor force (Autor, Katz &
Krueger, 1998; Krueger, 1993). These new innovations raise the productivity of skilled
and educated labor, raising the demand for and wages of skilled and educated labor.
However, these technological advancements may have little or no impact on low-skilled
or less educated labor, and may not necessarily raise the productivity of the low skilled
segment of the labor force (Levy & Murnane, 1992). Thus, as new technologies are
adopted by firms, the demand for and wages of low skilled and less educated labor
decline. In other words, new technology is a complementary input to skilled labor, but a
substitute input for unskilled labor. As the adoption of new technology occurs, the
income gap between the skilled and the unskilled continues to widen. 9

9 It should be noted that non-neutral technological change need not necessarily be embodied in the adoption
of new types of physical capital. Lindbeck and Snower (1996) and Snower (1998) make an intriguing case
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Theoretically, SBTC may be responsible for the observed changes in many other
potential factors connected to rising inequality, including the decline in unionization,
trade openness, and basic labor market supply and demand conditions. 10 For example,
unionization rates could have declined as new technology became cheap relative to semiskilled production labor. As blue-collar union labor pushed nominal wages higher
through collective bargaining during the 1970s, firms could have found it in their
interests to substitute more capital (and the new technology embodied in that capital) for
semi-skilled union manufacturing labor, thus reducing the power of unions as the demand
for union labor became more elastic, especially during the early 1980s (Asher & DeFina,
1995; Fortin & Lemieux, 1997; Freeman, 1996; Hyclak, 2000). The decline in the real
costs of new technology (such as the microprocessor) and capital may have also
contributed to this phenomenon (Greenwood, 1999).
In general, most studies have found trade alone to playa very minimal role in
explaining the rising gap in the wage structure since the 1970s (Berman et al., 1994;
Harrigan, 1997, 1998; Irwin, 2002). The dominant explanatory variable that appears
repeatedly is technological change. To the extent that technological change interacts with
trade openness and trade flows, the two variables may reinforce one another, with
technological change playing the dominant role. New technology and trade openness
may have interacted in one of two ways to raise inequality since the 1970s. On the one
hand, the introduction of new technologies may have been a result of increased foreign

that organizational restructuring at the fIrm level is a type of "technological change" that raises the
productivity and demand for skilled and educated labor with specifIc multitasking and human relations
skills, and argue that organizational restructuring explains the rise in inequality both within and between
groups.
10 Acemoglu (2002b) argues that the rise in wage and income inequality in Europe has been less acute than
in the United States and the United Kingdom because European labor market institutions encouraged
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trade, in which case these two factors (technology change and trade openness) might have
interacted to raise the income gap over time (Brauer & Hickok, 1995; Harrigan, 1997;
Leamer, 1996). Greater trade openness may have induced the adoption of new
technologies. As manufacturing firms struggled to compete for global market share with
lower-cost competitors in the 1970s and 1980s, they certainly would have considered
adopting new technologies as a means of enhancing their efficiency and competitiveness.
If these new technologies were substitutes for low-skilled union labor, firms could have
seen an opportunity to raise productivity and lower costs by restructuring their production
around more capital-intensive techniques combined with high-skilled labor (Bhagwati,
1995).
On the other hand, SBTC may have been the driving force underlying the sectoral
shift in trade flows. In other words, the adoption of new technologies in the United States
may have induced an increase in imports oflabor-intensive goods from abroad,
particularly durable goods. If technological change in the U.S. caused the shift in imports
toward durable goods as the U.S. economy moved toward the production of hightechnology services and goods not classified as "durable," then increased technological
change may have led to the change in trade flows and the level of imports as a percentage
of GDP. The shift in trade flows brought about by new technology may have indirectly
impacted wage inequality by lowering the demand for less skilled labor (Borjas &
Ramey, 1994; Irwin, 2002).11

European finns to adopt technologies that were less skill-biased and more skill-replacing, thus raising the
productivity of less skilled workers in these economies compared to the u.s. and UK economies.
11 For further investigations into the linkages between trade openness, immigration and u.s. income
inequality see Borjas (1995), Freeman (1995), Harrigan (1997, 1998), Johnson and Stafford (1993),
Lawrence (1995), Leamer (1996), Revenga (1992), Richardson (1995), and Wood (1995).
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The introduction of non-neutral skill-biased technology may also underlie supply
and demand factors in labor markets (Katz & Murphy, 1992; Murphy & Welch, 1992;
Topel, 1997). SBTC may explain the shift in demand for skilled labor, and may explain
why, in the face of a rising supply of educated workers since the 1970s, the demand for
skilled labor continues to push up the wages of the more educated segment of the labor
force (Levy & Murnane, 1992). The more popular view is that SBTC had its greatest
impact on labor demand, as explained here. That is, new innovations and the
introduction of new technologies are exogenous to the conditions of supply and demand
in labor markets, and these new innovations, once they exist, then lead to a marked
increase in the demand for skilled labor and a marked decrease in the c1smand for
unskilled labor.
However, Acemoglu (2002a) and Kiley (1997) make an interesting case for
endogenous SBTC that presents problems for the demand-side theory. These authors
focus on the supply of skilled labor as the impetus to SBTC and innovation. Acemoglu
and Kiley ask whether the increase in the supply of skilled and educated labor since the
1970s might not have induced firms to begin producing new types of capital that take
advantage of higher levels of education and skills. This is, in some sense, a "supplycreates-its-own-demand" type oftheory, and is a complete inversion of the more popular
demand-side exogenous theory of SBTC. According to Acemoglu, technical change is
driven by the profit motive, and firms can only profit from developing new technologies
if these new technical inputs are complimentary to or compatible with the skills of the
labor market. Thus, prior to the 20th century, technologies were skill-replacing (rather
than skill-biased) because the overwhelming proportion of the labor market was
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unskilled. That is, finns developed technologies that could increase the productivity of
the low-skilled labor force of the time period. But, with the growth of more educated and
skilled labor during the 20th century, and particularly since WWII, new technologies are
able to take advantage of the greater supply of skilled labor, and are now more profitable
to implement, leading to endogenous skill-biased technical change, and a rise in labor
market earnings inequality driven from the supply side rather than by demand.
While this theory is certainly plausible and intriguing, it fails to explain clearly
why a relatively moderate and stable increase in the supply of skilled and educated labor
since WWII would result in such a marked surge in the demand for skilled and educated
labor beginning in the 1980-;, Why the delay? Why, according to Goldin and Margo
(1992), do we observe wage compression in the 1940s and a stable wage distribution
from the 1950s to the 1970s if the rising supply of skilled labor is responsible for the rise
in inequality? Acemoglu (2002a) attempts to answer these criticisms by positing an
"acceleration hypothesis" relative to the demand for skills, but the argument remains
somewhat unconvincing. At any rate, he fails to identify why the demand for skills has
far outpaced the supply of skills if it is truly the supply-side that drives the demand for
technological change. Should not the two rise in equal magnitude together? If not, why
not?
While it remains the dominant explanation for the rise in inequality since the
1970s, the demand-side SBTC theory is not without critics. Card and DiNardo (2002)
question the explanatory power of the SBTC theory of rising wage and income
inequality, pointing out that wage and income inequality began to stabilize in the 1990s
even as technological change (apparently) continued to accelerate. One explanation for
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this may be that technological change has become less skill-biased and more skillreplacing in recent years, particularly as personal computers and other technological
advancements have become more "user friendly." If so, this would tend to (moderately)
reduce the relative demand for skilled over unskilled labor, restraining the rise in wage
and income inequality by perhaps raising the productivity ofless skilled laborers.
Others have argued that while SBTC may explain some of the rise in wage and
income inequality since the 1970s, other factors such as trade openness and immigration
(Borjas, 1995; Borjas & Ramey, 1994; Johnson & Stafford, 1993; Revenga, 1992;
Richardson, 1995; Wood, 1995), and institutional changes such as the level of
unionization and minimum wages (Asher & DeFina, 1995; Fortin & Lemieux, 1997;
Freeman, 1996; Hyclak, 1996, 2000) are also independently responsible. These authors
argue that trade and institutional factors, rather than simply interacting with technological
changes, have had a moderate impact on wage and income inequality independent of the
effects of SBTC.
The most difficult and troubling aspect of the research on the relationship between
SBTC and income inequality has been the difficulty in identifying an appropriate
measure of technological change. The literature on growth theory has also struggled to
more specifically define technological change other than to label it as the "Solow
Residual." Krueger (1993) attempted to operationally define technological change in
terms of the use of personal computers in the workforce. However, this leaves much
technological change unmeasured, and most authors have simply treated technology as a
left-over "residual" that "falls out" after other factors have been accounted for (Berman et
aI., 1994). This leaves much to be desired, and is one ofthe reasons that the SBTC
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theory of inequality is treated as somewhat tenuous. Given the research efforts to date,
we can conclude that SBTC seems to account for the majority of the rise in inequality
simply by ruling out other factors that are relatively weak in explanatory power.
However, the inability to identify a variable that measures the concept we label
"technological change" has proven frustrating. The present research hopes to partially
remedy this problem in attempting to employ a valid measure of SBTC.

Summary and Theoretical Framework

Research to date suggests that the growth-inequality relationship first posited by
Kuznets varies over time and depends upon the stage of economic development, the state
and pace of technological change, and the measures of growth and inequality used in the
analysis. The evidence suggests that, at least for developed economies such as the United
States, the maturation of industrialization and urbanization during the 1950s and 1960s
may have witnessed the end of a period of negative association between inequality and
growth, and that the 1970s and 1980s may have been a turning point beyond which the
growth-inequality relationship becomes positive, at least for a time (even if the rate of
growth is below its secular trend, such as during the productivity slowdown from 1973 to
1994). Can we observe this turning point in the Kuznets Curve empirically? If so, what
might explain it? If technological improvements enhance economic growth by raising the
productivity of labor and thus output per capita, we can expect new technologies to
account for increased economic growth, particularly during the 1990s. And, if new
technologies are non-neutral in their impact on labor productivity, then this may also
account for the rise in inequality. Thus, any observed turning point in the Kuznets Curve
in developed, post-industrial economies might be explained by the existence ofSBTC.
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The present research seeks evidence in support of this theory by investigating the
relationship between technological change and growth, and between growth and changes
in inequality. Ifboth of these relationships are found to be positive, it would seem to
lend support to the SBTC theory of rising inequality, and would also demonstrate a
possible reformulation of the original Kuznets Hypothesis.

38

CHAPTER III

Methodology, Data and Formal Hypotheses
Model Conceptualization

The conceptual framework of the research model rests on two primary hypotheses
relating three constructs: technological change, per capita economic growth, and income
inequality, in that order. The first hypothesis is that technological change and per capita
economic growth are positively correlated, and that technological change exerts a causal
influence on per capita output. This assertion is based upon the relatively simple and
well-known idea that technological improvements encourage per capita economic growth
(Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986; Solow, 1956, 1957). The theoretical neoclassical growth
model is given in Equation 1, below, where YIN is the output-per-capita ratio, KIN is the
capital-to-labor ratio, and A and H are exogenous factors representing the level of
technology and human capital development, respectively. The functional form of the
technology-growth relationship to be tested in the present research is given in Equation 2
where VI is the change in per capita economic growth,
technological change,
growth, and
(2)

&

(J

T

is a vector of variables measuring

is a measure of human capital improvement, yis population

is an error term (a], a2, a3 and a4 are estimated coefficients):
YIN = f{(KIN),A,H}

(3)
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The second hypothesis is that technology-driven per capita economic growth will
be positively correlated with income inequality if technological change is non-neutral or
skill-biased in some way and is a strong determinant of growth. That is, non-neutral,
SBTC may explain any observed positive association between growth and inequality if
new technologies raise the productivity of high-skilled labor disproportionately to lowskilled labor. This assertion derives from the research on SBTC and inequality, and ties
this literature to the growth-inequality relationship. Thus, technological change may
drive per capita economic growth, and economic growth, in tum, may partially explain
rising inequality in urban economies. The functional form of the growth-inequality
relationship to be tested in the present research is given in Equation 3, below, where c/J is
the change in inequality,

Ij/ (from

Equation 2) is real per capita economic growth, A

represents decennial changes in a vector of control variables, and v is an error term (80,
8 j , and 82 are estimated coefficients):

(4)

c/J= 80 +8j lj/+ 82 A + v
Justification of Statistical Estimation Method

To test for the potential determinants of inter-metropolitan or inter-urban
household income inequality, previous research has relied overwhelmingly on standard
OLS multiple regression techniques, typically utilizing cross-sectional Census data with
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as the primary unit of analysis. This method of
exploring the potential determinants of inequality is rooted in the work of Aigner and
Heins (1967) and AI-Sarnrnarie and Miller (1967) who employed this approach to
investigate state-level Census data on a number of factors hypothesized to explain the
observed variation in inequality between U.S. states. This method was developed and
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applied to MSAs by Mooney (1967) to investigate the relationship between
unemployment and urban poverty. In his landmark work on urban inequality, Betz
(1972) employs a series of standard OLS multiple regressions in a path analysis model,
and, by the mid-1970s and early 1980s, OLS regression methods had become the
standard statistical technique in a series of research papers investigating the relationship
between city population size and household inequality (Bums, 1975; Danziger, 1976;
Farbman, 1975; Garofalo & Fogarty, 1979; Haworth, Long & Rasmussen, 1978, 1979;
Hirsch, 1982; Kennedy & Nord, 1984; Long, Rasmussen & Haworth, 1977; Nord, 1980a,
1980b; Yinger & Danziger, 1978). More recent research employing this method to
investigate explanations of metropolitan inequality, income growth, unemployment
and/or economic growth can be found in Chakravorty (1996a), Cloutier (1997), Drennan,
Tobier & Lewis (1996), Galster (1989), Glaeser & Mare (2001), Madden (2000), and
Moomaw & Shatter (1996).
The present research will use a method similar to that cited in the above literature,
employing a two-stage least-squares multiple regression model to first investigate the
effect of technological change on per capita metropolitan economic growth and, second,
the effect of per capita economic growth on metropolitan household income inequality.
As mentioned above, the two-stage regression model is being employed to test for
endogeneity ofthe economic growth variable in the second-stage income inequality
equation. By employing a two-stage regression model in combination with Hausman's
(1976) specification test for simultaneity, we can answer the question as to whether
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inequality has any causal effect on economic growth, as suggested by the median voter
theory of the growth-inequality relationship. 12
The unit of analysis, as in previous research, will be the MSAlCMSA, and the
present study will compare the change in cross-sectional MSAlCMSA data from 1990
through 2000. (PMSAs, per se, were excluded in favor of the larger CMSAs as units of
analysis in this study because CMSAs are thought to offer a better geographic definition
of a cohesive singular economy without the theoretical problems of spillovers between
PMSAs due to their close proximity to each other.) All MSAlCMSA 1990 data have
been updated to reflect changes in the geographic definitions of MSAs or CMSAs
between 1990 and 2000Y
Based upon the literature review and theories set forth above, measures of
technological change over this decade should exhibit a positive relationship to per capita
urban economic growth over the same time period, suggesting that metropolitan areas
with relatively greater levels of technological advancement will experience higher per
capita economic growth. More importantly, based upon the research linking SBTC with
widening inequality, we might also expect that predicted or actual levels of decennial per
capita economic growth emerging from the first regression to be positively and
significantly correlated with changes in a given measure of metropolitan household
income inequality over the same decade as predicted in the second regression. By
demonstrating a positive relationship between technology-driven economic growth and
income inequality, while properly controlling for a number of additional variables that
have also been shown to account for the variation in the household income distribution,

12

For further explanation of the Hausman simultaneity test, see Gujarati, 1995, pp. 669-671.
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this finding would enable us to lend greater weight to the theory that SBTC indirectly
accounts for growing inequality in urban economies in the United States.

Operational Definitions, Variables, Hypotheses, and Data Sources
The uniqueness of the present research, and what sets it apart from prior
investigations into the determinants of inequality or the relationship between inequality
and growth, is the use of distinct and innovative measures of both economic growth and
technological change. An additional improvement is the use of MSAlCMSA economic
units with many more cases and much more reliable and comparable data than can be
obtained in cross-sectional or panel data across highly diverse developing or developed
economIes.
Technological change has been an elusive and difficult-to-define concept
plaguing previous investigations. That is, the inability to operationally define and
measure the concept of "technology" has weakened the case for the theory of non-neutral
SBTC as an explanation for rising inequality. The present research hopes to at least
partially remedy this weakness in the literature by offering measurable definitions of
technology and technological change. 14 There are good theoretical and empirical reasons
to believe that the measures of technological change used in the present research will be
positively correlated with metropolitan economic growth over the decade in question, and
that they may also be (indirectly) linked to rising income inequality.
Additional weaknesses have plagued prior research on the relationship between
inequality and growth. The definition of economic growth used in previous research has

13 Specifically, the 1990 data from the Census Bureau have been updated by Geolytics, Inc. to conform to
Census 2000 geographic boundaries.
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been limited to median household income levels per MSA rather than a closer measure of
total economic output for the entire metropolitan economy. The present research uses a
distinct indicator of metropolitan economic growth designed to measure real output per
capita, further improving weaknesses in previous research relating inequality to economic
growth.
The first-stage regression will use multiple independent variables measuring
technological change and the level of human capital development as predictors of real per
capita metropolitan economic growth. The dependent variable in the model is a measure
of metropolitan economic growth, and will be operationally defined as the percentage
change in re::tl per capita Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP) from 1090 to 2000. 15 GMP
is a concept analogous to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the commonly accepted metric
of a nation's total economic output (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2001). By utilizing a
measurable concept that captures the value of all final economic output in a given area
over a specified time period, this variable provides a much more specific and widely
accepted definition of economic growth than has been employed in previous studies.
Real per capita GMP captures an estimate ofthe total constant-dollar I 6 production output
of a metropolitan economy, something distinctly absent from measures such as real
median household income levels used in previous studies. This lesser measure may

14 Although no claim is made here regarding whether these measures of technological change are
necessarily skill-biased, skill-neutral or skill-replacing, a point that is relevant to the findings, below.
15 The GMP data source is from Global Insight (formerly Standard & Poor's DRI-WEFA) and the United
States Conference of Mayors. The data can be found at
http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/press releases/documents/npc 07100 I.asp
16 All variables with dollar figures for both regression equations in the present research are expressed in
constant, inflation-adjusted 2000 dollars. The nominal dollar figures for each of these variables were
adjusted using the national CPI-U (the consumer price index for all urban consumers) reported by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Nominal dollar figures for 1990 were adjusted to constant inflation-adjusted
2000 dollars using the following CPI-U index numbers for each year, respectively: 130.7 and 172.2 (base
year 1982-1984 = 100). The precedent for employing the nationwide CPI-U rather than individual
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provide infonnation about the household income levels of the persons who reside in the
metropolitan area, and we would generally expect it to be correlated with per capita
output, but it is less able to capture the full economic output and productivity of that
urban economy. 17
The measure of per capita economic growth utilized in this research is not without
weaknesses, however. Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP) is computed as a derivative of
Gross State Product (GSP) data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For each
state, GSP is allocated by industry to the counties and metropolitan areas within that
state. This allocation is done based upon the relative concentrations of these industries in
the metropolitan areas us measured by employment and labor market concentrations in
these industries and within each county. The distribution of GSP to each county is based
upon the employment weighting of each industry in that county according to the first two
digits in the SIC occupational categories. 18 Thus, the relative labor concentration of
employment in a given industry and county detennines the amount of GSP that is
appropriated to each county and/or MSAlCMSA. This approach, while perhaps offering
the most plausible estimate of metropolitan per capita output, is not exact and is subject
to error. However, the weaknesses of this estimate are thought to be a reasonable
tradeoff in obtaining a new and innovative measure of economic growth at the
metropolitan level.

metropolitan consumer price indexes to adjust nominal dollar values can be found in Drennan, Tobier and
Lewis, 1996.
17 In a separate test, the percentage change in real per capita GMP from 1990 to 2000 was found to be
positively and significantly correlated with the percentage change in metropolitan real median household
income from 1989 to 1999, indicating some similarity in these two measures of economic growth. The
bivariate correlation between these two variables is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence
level (p-value :s .001). This suggests that these two measures of income (one per capita, the other per
household) are capturing similar effects or are measuring roughly similar patterns of output and/or income.
18 Email from statistician at Global Insight, Inc., dated December 23,2003.
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Per capita metropolitan economic growth from 1990 to 2000 will be regressed on
two independent variables measuring technological change. The first measure of
technological change will be operationally defined as the percentage change in per capita
utility patent approvals per MSAICMSA from 1990 to 1999.

19

Utility patent approvals

have been shown to be an important indicator of technological advancement (Worgan &
Nunn, 2002), although their association with economic growth is less well understood.
Theoretically, we would expect that urban areas with relatively greater levels of per
capita patent approval could also experience relatively higher levels of per capita growth,
all else constant. Although not all patents are useful patents leading to new innovations
or to increased economic output (Griliches, 1990), general utility patents pE'r MSA might
be expected to reveal something about the pace of technological development that could
raise economic growth.
Higgs (1971) first used state per capita patent data as an operationalization of the
concept of inventiveness (or entrepreneurship) to test for the relationship between the
level of inventiveness and economic growth. In his original investigation, Higgs found
that states with higher levels of urbanization also exhibited relatively more patents per
capita than other states. Higgs' conclusion was that urbanization has technological
spillover effects due to agglomeration economies and advantages of proximity, leading to
higher levels of economic growth in more urbanized states. This nuanced use of utility

19 The MSA general utility patent data source is the United States Patent Office. A "utility" patent is
granted to inventors of new and useful improvements, machines, or processes. The utility patent is
overwhelmingly the most common type of patent issued by the USPO. The utility patent is distinct from
design, plant, reissue and statutory patents because it is granted solely for new inventions and processes
(see Worgan and Nunn, 2002, p. 230).
At the time of this writing, the U.S. Patent Office had not yet compiled MSA-Ievel utility patent data for
the year 2000. 1999 utility patent approvals per MSA were the latest patent data available. Thus, in
computing per capita utility patent approvals per MSAlCMSA for the year 2000, 1999 utility patent
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patent approval data in Higgs' research was an important contribution, and opened up the
possibility of measuring the concept of technological change.
Griliches (1990), building on the previous work of Schmookler (1954, 1957),
evaluates the pros and cons of the use of patent data as an indicator of a variety of
economic concepts including economic growth, technological change, the competitive
position of firms and economies, and the level of inventiveness in specific geographic
regions. Griliches points out a number of weaknesses in the use of patent statistics. First,
general utility patents are difficult to classify in terms of the inventions to which they
lead. Do we assign the invention indicated by the patent to the industry in which it was
discovered, to the industry that is likely to produce the new invention, or to the industry
that is likely to use the invention in producing other goods and services? This is a
dilemma because the firm or geographic location from which the patent originates may
benefit little or not at all from the productivity advantages ofthe patented invention.
Additionally, many patents may not lead to any useful inventions or have any meaningful
economic impacts. Some products or processes that are patented may have little or no
economic value, thus inflating the measure of inventive activity expressed in patent data.
On the other hand, some products or processes may have enormous economic value, but
are not patented because the inventor(s) did not want to disclose information required to
obtain the patent. This would tend to deflate the measure of inventive activity reflected
in patent data.
Despite the weaknesses of patent data, Griliches concludes that patent data are
generally a "good" indicator of technological change and the level of inventiveness,

approval data from the U.S. Patent Office were divided by 2000 metropolitan population level data from
the U.S. Census Bureau.
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particularly in the absence of any reasonable substitute (such as the specific levels ofR &
D spending by finns or R&D spending in specific geographic locations). In spite of
these difficulties, patent data remain a unique and valuable resource for the analysis of
the processes of technological change and inventiveness, according to Griliches. In a
more recent article, Worgan and Nunn (2002) find support for Griliches' conclusions
regarding the validity of patent data as a measure of economic change and innovation. In
related work, Nunn and Worgan (2001, 2002) employ patent data to demonstrate the
importance of its use as a gauge of economic development and innovation in urban
economIes.
A variety of published research in the past decade has made use of patent data as
an indicator of technological change and inventiveness. Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and
Henderson (1993) use patent data to measure the association between inventiveness and
locational spillovers in urban economies. Using patent citation statistics, these authors
find that later patents tend to emanate from geographic locations that are in close
proximity to the previous patents they cite, suggesting self-reinforcing inventiveness
owing to localized technological spillovers. O'hUallachain (1999) finds a similar pattern
in patent data. He employs patent data as a measure of technological change and finds a
strong positive association between patent frequency and population size in MSAs. In a
similar research vein, Carlino (2001) uses patent data to investigate the detenninants of
the levels of inventiveness in urban areas, with patents per capita as the dependent
variable in his model.
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The second measure of technological change will be operationally defined in
terms of the change in the proportion20 of laborers employed in professional-,
managerial-, and technology-related jobs per MSAICMSA from 1990 to 2000.

21

The

proportion of workers employed in professional-, managerial-, or technology-intensive
jobs in a local economy could also have a strong linkage to urban economic growth. The
growth or contraction in the proportion of professional and managerial positions, or in
technology-related jobs in the computer sciences, health sciences, engineering, and
research and development industries should be a valid indicator of technological change
in the urban economy, and one we would theoretically expect to co-vary with the change
in metropolitan economic output.
This measure is also a staple in the research on economic growth and innovation
in urban areas. O'hUallachain (1999) uses a similar measure as a control variable in his
investigation of innovation and city size, finding a strong positive association between
the proportion of the labor force in high-technology jobs and the level of economic
innovation. Other researchers make similar findings when employing some measure of

20 For many of the variables used in this study, the decision was made to employ the change in the
proportion of the population with a given characteristic, as opposed to the percentage rate of change in the
raw number of people with that attribute over the decade in question. The latter measure would have
ignored overall MSAlCMSA population changes (growth or contraction) that might have effected the
number of people in the given categories. That is, for example, the percentage change in the absolute
number of people in technology-intensive occupations per MSA might have been influenced by a
corresponding change in the MSAlCMSA population over the decade. On the other hand, the former
measure using the change in the proportion of the population in technology-intensive occupations allows us
to control for population changes by using a proportionate rather than an absolute measure. This
methodology is employed throughout.
21 The data source for the number of workers in professional-, managerial-, and technology-related jobs per
MSAlCMSA in both 1990 and 2000 is from the Bureau of the Census, 1990 and 2000 Summary File 3.
This measure includes: managerial, business and financial occupations, including business managers and
financial specialists; computer and mathematical occupations, architecture and engineering occupations,
legal and educational/training occupations; art, entertainment and media occupations; and health
technologist and technician occupations. This broad category (defmed by the Census Bureau) includes
occupations that are most likely to be considered "high skilled." By defmition, these occupations would be
considered "skill-biased" and would be most likely to be complimentary with technological advancements
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labor market structure that accounts for employment in technology-related or other highskilled sectors (Carlino, 2001; Cloutier, 1997; Hyclak, 1996).
Florida (2004) argues that growing urban economies are marked by an increasing
contingent of professionals who generate new technologies and new ideas through
networks of creativity within an urban economy. He suggests that this "creative class" of
workers, instilled with a high level of diversity, individuality, intelligence, education,
drive, and creativity, are one of the primary forces behind why some urban and regional
economies experience rapid development and economic growth. The variable used here
to measure the proportionate change in technology and professional occupations per
MSAlCMSA may be expected to capture elements of this "creative clas,",," allowing us to
empirically test Florida's theories on metropolitan economic growth and development.
Ifboth of these measures of technological change have the expected influence on
metropolitan economic growth, then we are led to the following hypotheses: There is a
statistically significant positive relationship between the percentage change in per capita
utility patent approvals per MSAlCMSA from 1990-1999 and the growth rate of per
capita real GMP from 1990 to 2000; and, there is a statistically significant positive
relationship between the change in the proportion oflaborers employed in professional-,
managerial-, and technology-related jobs per MSAlCMSA from 1990 to 2000 and the
growth rate of per capita real GMP from 1990 to 2000.
The third independent variable in the first-stage regression will be a measure of
metropolitan human capital development, operationalized as the 1990 to 2000 change in
the proportion of the MSA/CMSA population age 25 and over with a four-year degree or

in the workplace. They are also most likely to include and be consistent with Richard Florida's (2003)
defmition of the concept of a "creative class" of workers.
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beyond. 22 Becker's (1961) classic work on human capital theory suggests that the
improvement of human capital is critical to economic development, and Romer (1986)
and Lucas (1988, 2004) both include human capital as an important ingredient to
economic growth in their theoretical research. In a recent cross-country comparison,
Barro (2001) finds a strong positive relationship between human capital levels,
operationalized as years of education, and economic growth. Barro's findings confirm
that both the quantity and the quality of education promote economic growth. Goldin and
Katz (2001) make similar conclusions about the United States economy over the 20

th

century (see also Glomm & Ravikumar, 1992). Gottlieb and Fogarty (2003) find a
statistically significant positive relationship between a level of educ~tional'lttainment,
measured as the percentage of the metropolitan population with a four-year degree in
1980, and subsequent metropolitan per capita income growth rates from 1980 to 1997.
Based upon findings from previous research, then, we would expect MSAs and CMSAs
with a more rapid increase in human capital development to exhibit a higher level of
output per capita. All else constant, we expect a statistically significant positive
relationship between the change in the proportion of the MSNCMSA population with a
four-year degree or more from 1990 to 2000 and the growth rate of per capita real GMP
from 1990 to 2000.
A fourth and final variable will be included in the first-stage regression to control
for the broad effects of population growth on MSNCMSA per capita economic output.
O'hUallachain (1999) shows that popUlation growth and size playa large role in the level
of inventive activity and technological change. His findings imply that there may be a

22 The data source on MSA education levels in 1990 and 2000 comes from the Bureau of the Census, 1990
and 2000 Summary File 3.
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two-way causation between these concepts: as population grows, inventive activity rises,
but as inventive activity rises, population may grow in response.
Population change will be operationally defined as the population growth rate per
MSAICMSA from 1990 to 2000 (the percentage change in metropolitan population from
1990 to 2000), and this factor will be used as a fourth control variable in the first-stage
regression model.

23

We expect a statistically significant positive relationship between the

MSAlCMSA population growth rate from 1990 to 2000 and the growth rate of per capita
real GMP from 1990 to 2000.
A summary of the variables included in the first-stage regression is provided in

Table 1, below. The first-stage estimating equation is specified in Equation 4,
(5)
where

IjI is

the estimated value of real per capita GMP growth from 1990 to 2000, r1 is

the percentage change in per capita utility patent approvals per MSAlCMSA from 1990
to 1999, r2 is the change in the proportion of the MSAICMSA population employed in
technology-related jobs per MSAICMSA from 1990 to 2000,

(j

is the change in the

proportion of the MSAlCMSA population holding a four-year degree or beyond from
1990 to 2000, and r is the MSAICMSA population growth rate from 1990 to 2000.

/30,

/31, /32, /33 and /34 are estimated coefficients from the data, and I-l is an error term.

23 The data source on MSA population growth from 1990 to 2000 is from the Bureau of the Census, 1990
and 2000 Summary File 3.
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Table 1: Summary a/variables infirst-stage regression estimating per capita growth

a

r

Variable Name
% I'l in real per capita GMP 19902000
% I'l in per capita utility patent
approvals per MSAlCMSA 19901999
I'l in proportion ofMSAlCMSA
population in professional-,
managerial-, and technology-related
jobs 1990-2000
I'l in proportion of MSAlCMSA
population with a four-year degree or
more 1990-2000
% I'l in MSAlCMSA population
1990-2000

Expected Correlation

+
+

+

+

The second-stage regression model will regress a standard measure of household
income inequality on a number of different independent variables. The second-stage
model will be designed to permit an investigation of the determinants of the variation in
household income inequality in metropolitan areas from 1990 to 2000. The dependent
variable employed to measure the change in the level of urban household income
inequality will be operationally defined as the point change in the household gross
income Gini coefficient (the Gini index) per MSAICMSA from 1990 to 2000.
The household income Gini index is one of the most popular measures of income
inequality in use today, and is widely accepted as a valid and reliable measure of the
variance in the income distribution. The Gini index measures the level of income
inequality across cumulative income quintiles, or cumulative income fifths, as they are
plotted along a Lorenz Curve from the lowest fifth (or quintile) to the highest fifth
(Gastwirth, 1972; Ryscavage, 1999). The Gini coefficient is a measure between 0 and 1,
where 0 indicates perfect equality of incomes across all quintiles, and 1 indicates perfect
inequality of incomes with the top household possessing 100 percent of all income. As
an example of the use of this index in the present study, the Gini coefficient for the entire
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United States stood at 0.376 in 1979, and had risen to 0.410 by 1989, indicating a 0.034
point increase, or an increase of roughly nine percent, over this ten-year period
(Ryscavage, 1999).
The Gini index is not the only measure of income inequality available,24 and it
exhibits certain weaknesses and advantages when compared to other measures. For
example, changes in the Gini index are most sensitive to income changes or transfers
taking place in the middle of the income distribution. An income transfer of a given
amount will have a larger impact on the middle of the income distribution as measured by
the Gini, whereas other measures of inequality may reflect a larger change at the upper or
lower tail<: ofthe income distribution resulting from the same income transfer (Levy &
Murnane, 1992; Ryscavage, 1999). The choice of any income inequality measure is
fraught with tradeoffs. In a comparison of normative and descriptive measures of
inequality, Kaplow (2002) argues that the Gini index is a "useful" descriptive indicator of
inequality, but how useful depends on its specific application and the accompanying
theoretical framework in which it is used. Nonetheless, the Gini index is one of the most
widely accepted, valid, and reliable measures of income inequality, and is chosen for use
in the present research because it is easily comparable with previous inequality research
using this measure (Al-Samarrie & Miller, 1967; Betz, 1972; Bums, 1975; Chakravorty,
1996a; Cloutier, 1997; Danziger, 1976; Farbman, 1975; Galster, 1989; Garofalo &
Fogarty, 1979; Haworth et aI., 1978; Hirsch, 1982; Kennedy & Nord, 1984; Madden,

24 See Nelson and Lorence (1985, 1988) for research on urban inequality using an alternative measure of
inequality.
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2000; Nord, 1980a, 1980b). The Gini index is also the most easily obtainable measure of
household income inequality for MSAs and CMSAs.

25

The Gini coefficient for each MSAlCMSA will be computed from 1990 and 2000
Census data,26 and the point difference between the 1990 and 2000 Gini coefficient will
serve as the dependent variable in the second-stage regression. That is, if the Gini
coefficient rises from, say, 0.425 in 1990 to 0.490 in 2000, for example, the point change
in the Gini coefficient would be 0.065, and this point change value would serve as the
dependent variable in the regression. If the point change in the MSA Gini index is
positive, this will indicate an increase in metropolitan household income inequality over
the decade. Conversely, if the point change in the MSA Gini ;ndex is negative, this will
indicate a decrease in metropolitan household income inequality over the decade. The
point change in the Gini index will be regressed on a number of independent variables to
investigate the possible determinants of rising or falling income inequality from 1990 to
2000. (Unless otherwise explicitly noted, the data for all of the independent variables
used in the second-stage regression model are also from the Bureau of the Census, 1990
and 2000 Summary File 3.)
The first regressor in the second-stage equation will be the actual or predicted
growth rate of per capita real GMP from 1990 to 2000, depending upon the results of the
first regression and the Hausman's specification test for simultaneity (Hausman, 1976;

25 See Galbraith and Kum (2002), Gastwirth (1972), Kaplow (2002), Levy and Murnane (1992) and
Ryscavage (1999, pp. 33-44) for further descriptions of the Gini index, how it is calculated, pros and cons
of the Gini, and alternative measures of inequality.
26 Gini coefficients used in the current study were computed by the Census Bureau, Special Tabulations
Division, based upon household income reported on the 1990 and 2000 Census "long form." The smallest
unit of analysis for which long form data are directly and openly available from the Census Bureau is the
census block-group level. The Gini computations were therefore performed by the Special Tabs Division
of the Census Bureau because the author does not have access to individual or household level long-form
Census data.
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see above). A preliminary second-stage regression will be run including both predicted
economic growth and its residual (from the first-stage model) as independent variables.
Ifthe residual variable is found to be statistically significant in this preliminary secondstage model, then this tells us that both the residual and actual economic growth are
endogenous to inequality, thus suggesting two-way causality between inequality and
economic growth. In this case, we will use the predicted growth rate of per capita real
GMP from 1990 to 2000 in the actual second-stage regression model. On the other hand,
if the residual variable from the first-stage model is not found to be statistically
significant, then this suggests that endogeneity of economic growth to inequality is not a
problem, and we will use actual values of the growth rate of per capita reill GMP from
1990 to 2000 in the actual second-stage regression model. 27
It is this growth-inequality relationship that is most critical to the present research,

and it is anticipated that we will observe a positive relationship between the growth rate
in real per capita GMP and point changes in the Gini index measure of metropolitan
household income inequality if SBTC is a factor. If we find that the level of per capita
economic growth as predicted by technological change is positively and statistically
significantly related to the change in household income inequality, we can begin to
substantiate the claim that, ceteris paribus, technology-driven growth indirectly leads to
higher levels of inequality, at least over this decade in the United States' economy. This
would further suggest a possible "turning point" in the Kuznets curve in developed
economies as discussed above. If no significant relationship is found, or if a significant
negative relationship is observed, this would allow us to question the proposition that

For further clarification of this specification technique in testing for simultaneity problems, see Hausman,
1976, and Gujarati, 1995.

27
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technology-driven growth raises inequality. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
We expect a statistically significant positive relationship between the growth rate of real
per capita GMP from 1990 to 2000 and the change in MSA/CMSA household income
inequality from 1990 to 2000, all else constant.
The second independent variable in the second-stage regression will be the
change in MSA/CMSA educational inequality from 1990 to 2000. Educational inequality
will be operationally defined as the change in the proportion of the MSA/CMSA
population in the extreme tails of the educational distribution: those with either less than
a high school diploma, or a graduate/professional degree or more. 28 Previous research
suggests a positive relationship between the level of educational inequality and the level
of income inequality (Burns, 1975; Cloutier, 1997; Danziger, 1976; Garofalo & Fogarty,
1979; Levy, 1995). As the distribution of education becomes more unequal, the income
distribution also tends to become more unequal (see also Bishop, 1996; Kain &
Singleton, 1996; Kane & Rouse, 1995; Lynch, 1995). It is expected that metropolitan
areas with a growing proportion of people in the extreme tails of the educational
distribution would also exhibit higher levels of household income inequality, all else
constant, a finding that would specifically support the research findings by Cloutier
(1997). A positive relationship between this variable and the change in the Gini
coefficient is therefore expected: There is a statistically significant positive relationship

As indicated above, the decision was made to employ the change in the proportion of the population in
the extreme tails of the educational distribution as a measure of educational inequality, as opposed to the
percentage rate of change in the number of people in the extreme tails of the educational distribution over
the decade in question. The latter measure would have ignored overall MSAlCMSA population changes
(growth or contraction) that might have effected the number of people in the extreme educational
categories. That is, the percentage change in the absolute number of people in, say, the upper category of
the educational distribution might have been influenced by a corresponding change in the MSAlCMSA
population over the decade. On the other hand, the former measure using the change in the proportion of
28
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between the change in the percentage of the population in the extreme tails of the
educational distribution per MSAlCMSA from 1990 to 2000 and the change in
MSAlCMSA household income inequality from 1990 to 2000.
Racial segregation and the problem of "spatial mismatch" in urban areas may also
playa role in explaining metropolitan income inequality. If African-American
households are geographically separate from white households due to discrimination in
residential housing markets, and if this leads to barriers to employment and income
opportunities for black minority workers as numerous studies have suggested
(Chakravorty, 1996b; Holzer, 1987; Holzer & Ihlanfeldt, 1996; Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist,
1990; Kain; 1968; Massey & Denton, 1987; Wilson, 1987), this may, in turn, explain
observed levels and changes in inequality in metropolitan areas. Massey and Eggers
(1993) suggest that the metropolitan spatial concentration of affluence and poverty began
to accelerate in the 1970s. This is consistent with the time period during which it has
been found that income inequality also began rising (Levy & Murnane, 1992; Ryscavage,
1999). If the spatial concentration of higher and lower income households breaks down
along racial lines, then there may be a link between racial segregation and the rise in
income inequality. Additionally, industrial restructuring and suburbanization may have
led to employment mismatches for African-American residents isolated in central cities
(Moore & Laramore, 1990), perhaps leading to further inequality.29 An independent
variable is therefore included to test for the relationship between the change in racial
segregation and changes in metropolitan income inequality from 1990 to 2000. The

the population in the extreme education categories allows us to control for population changes by using a
proportionate rather than an absolute measure.
29 For a further investigation of urban spatial and residential effects on income, unemployment, and
inequality see Kodrzycki (1996), Mayer (1996), O'Regan and Quigley (1996) and Taylor and Ong (1995).
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change in racial segregation will be operationally defined in tenns of the point change in
Massey and Denton's (1987) Dissimilarity Index per MSNCMSA from 1990 to 2000.
The dissimilarity index is a measure of the percentage of African-Americans that would
need to relocate across census tracts to get a perfectly equal proportion of black residents
across the entire MSA (Glaeser and Vigdor, 2001).30 Ifracial segregation of residential
housing plays a role in metropolitan household income inequality, we would expect to
observe a positive relationship between the point change in the Massey and Denton
dissimilarity index and the point change in the Gini index per MSAICMSA from 1990 to
2000, all else equal: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the
change in racial housing segregation per MSAICMSA from 1990 to 2000 and the change
in MSNCMSA household income inequality from 1990 to 2000.
Several studies on urban income dispersion have tested for the effects of
government transfer payments on household income inequality (Cloutier, 1997;
Danziger, 1976; Farbman, 1975). The findings from these studies are mixed, with some
research finding a negative association between transfer payments and inequality
(Cloutier) while others find a positive association (Danziger). Farbman finds no
relationship between inequality and transfer payment levels per MSA. Theoretically, we

Dissimilarity index data for 1990 and 2000 are from the study by Glaeser and Vigdor, 2001, which also
includes a computational summary of the exact calculations used to compute the dissimilarity index. For
additional information on the precise calculations used to compute the dissimilarity index, see Massey and
Denton (1987). Of the 260 MSAs used in the current study, 238 of these metropolitan areas reflect the
1990 dissimilarity indexes computed by Glaeser and Vigdor in their Census Bureau study. The 1990
dissimilarity indexes for the remaining 22 MSAs were computed by the present author using the same
methodology employed by Glaeser and Vigdor, and include the following cities: Appleton-OshkoshNeenah, WI; Bangor, ME; Bellingham, WA; Billings, MT, Bismarck, ND; Brownsville, TX; Casper, WY;
Dover, DE; Dubuque, IA; Eau Claire, WI; Fargo-Moorehead, ND-MN; La Crosse, WI-MN; Laredo, TX;
Lewiston-Auburn, ME; Medford-Ashland, OR; Provo-Orem, UT; Rochester, MN; Sante Fe, NM;
Sheboygan, WI; Sioux Falls, SD; St. Cloud, MN; and Wausau, WI. For the 2000 data, dissimilarity
indexes for 250 of the total 260 MSAs used in the current study are from Glaeser and Vigdor, and the
remaining 10 were computed by the present author, including the following: Bangor, ME; Billings, MT;
30
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might expect transfer payment levels to reduce inequality by raising the incomes of the
lowest quintile in the income distribution. However, if relatively larger transfer payment
levels (or large increases in transfer payment spending) accompany a relatively larger
number oflow-income welfare-dependent households in the metropolitan area, higher
levels of transfer payments might coincide with higher levels of inequality.
To measure the effect of changes in transfer payments on changes in household
income inequality, we will include a variable capturing the percentage change in real per
capita total transfer payment spending per MSAJCMSA from 1990 to 2000.

31

The

expected direction of correlation between the percentage change in real per capita transfer
payments and the point change in the Gini index is indetenninate. Our hypothesis is thus
correlational but not directional: There is a statistically significant relationship between
the percentage change in real per capita transfer payment expenditures per MSAJCMSA
from 1990 to 2000 and the change in MSAJCMSA household income inequality from
1990 to 2000.
Five additional control variables will be included to test for the impact of various
demographic changes on metropolitan household income inequality: 1) the change in the
proportion of the black (including Hispanic) population per MSAJCMSA from 1990 to
2000,2) the change in the ratio of female head-of-household families to population per
MSAJCMSA from 1990 to 2000, 3) the change in the proportion of the population aged
65 and over per MSAJCMSA from 1990 to 2000, 4) a regional dummy variable for
MSAs and CMSAs in the South Census Region ofthe United States, and 5) the

Bismarck, ND; Casper, WY; Dubuque, IA; Eau Claire, WI; Laredo, TX; Lewiston-Auburn, ME; MedfordAshland, OR; and Sante Fe, NM.
31 Data for total real per capita transfer payments per MSAJCMSA from 1990 and 2000 are from the
Regional Economic Information System (REIS) produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
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population growth rate per MSAlCMSA from 1990 to 2000. Previous research suggests
that most of these control variables are correlated with household income inequality in
some way, some stronger, others weaker.
Aigner and Heins (1967), Al-Sammarie and Miller (1967), Betz (1972), Bums
(1975), Cloutier (1997), Danziger (1976), Farbman (1975), Garofalo and Fogarty (1979),
Haworth et al. (1978), Kennedy and Nord (1984), Long et al. (1977), Murray (1969), and
Nord (1980a and 1980b) all find overwhelmingly that the larger the nonwhite proportion
of the population, the higher the levels of income inequality. Nelson and Lorence (1985,
1988) find no relationship between the proportion of nonwhite population and inequality
in metropolitan economies when controlling for other factors.

32

And, Madden (2000), in

her study of metropolitan household inequality change from 1980 to 1990, finds that the
percentage growth in MSA nonwhite population did not significantly impact the changes
in income inequality over this period. However, most studies seem to indicate that the
urban income distribution may be heavily influenced by racial composition, with
nonwhites comprising a majority of the low-income quintiles and whites comprising a
majority of the high-income quintiles. Thus, in general, we would expect that cities with
an expanding African-American population from 1990 to 2000 would also exhibit
relatively larger increases in income inequality over this same period, all else constant:
There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the change in the
proportion of African-American population per MSAlCMSA from 1990 to 2000 and the
change in MSAlCMSA household income inequality from 1990 to 2000.

This may be due to the peculiar choice of inequality measure in the Nelson and Lorence studies. Rather
than using the traditional Gini index measure of income inequality, the two Nelson and Lorence studies use
the Thiel "information-based" inequality coefficient. The sensitivity of the Thiel index to urban racial
32
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Likewise, findings by Chakravorty (1996a), Cloutier (1997), Haworth et aI.,
(1978), Madden (2000), Nord (1980a, 1980b), and Ryscavage (1999) suggest that cities
with higher levels of female heads-of-household also exhibit higher levels of income
inequality (see also Hyslop, 2001). Single mothers typically earn relatively low incomes
and could be expected to make up a significant proportion oflow-income quintiles of the
income distribution. Thus, we would expect that MSAs/CMSAs with a growing
contingent of female head-of-household families from 1990 to 2000 would exhibit a
relatively greater increase in household income inequality over this decade, all else
constant: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the change in
the ratio of female-headed households to population prr MSA/CMSA from 1990 to 2000
and the change in MSAlCMSA household income inequality from 1990 to 2000.

In similar fashion, the proportion of elderly households on a fixed retirement
and/or Social Security income could easily impact the level of metropolitan income
inequality. Chakravorty (1996a), Cloutier (1997), Garofalo and Fogarty (1979), Kennedy
and Nord (1984), and Madden (2000) have all found that income inequality is positively
associated with a higher proportion of elderly in the urban population (aged 65 and
above). We would expect that MSAs or CMSAs with gains in the proportion of the
population aged 65 and over to also experience a more rapid increase in income
inequality. Although the elderly may have a large stock of accumulated assets and
wealth, their relatively low and fixed retirement incomes may tend to put them in the
lowest income quintiles of the income distribution, theoretically leading to higher levels
of income inequality the larger the proportion of elderly in the metropolitan population:

composition may be weaker than the Gini index, thus explaining the insignificant finding by Nelson and
Lorence.
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There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the change in the
proportion of the elderly population (age 65 and over) per MSAlCMSA from 1990 to
2000 and the change in MSAlCMSA household income inequality from 1990 to 2000, all
else constant.
Regional effects have been found to result in peculiar outcomes related to
metropolitan inequality in previous studies, most of which find higher levels of inequality
in the South than in other regions, all else constant (Chakravorty, 1996a; Cloutier, 1997;
Kennedy & Nord, 1984; Nelson & Lorence, 1985). Thus, we will also test for this
regional effect by including a similar dummy variable for MSAs/CMSAs in the South
Census Region in 1990. We would expect MSAs and CMSAs located in this region in
1990 to exhibit a stronger rise in household income inequality from 1990 through 2000
than other regions, all else constant: There is a statistically significant positive
relationship between the regional location of MSAs and CMSAs in 1990 and the change
in MSAlCMSA household income inequality from 1990 to 2000, with MSAs and
CMSAs in the South Central Census Region exhibiting larger increases in inequality.
Finally, MSA population growth rates and MSA population levels have been
found to be an important factor related to household income inequality in metropolitan
areas (Alperovich, 1995). Moreover, the use of metropolitan growth rates can serve as a
(loose) proxy for Kuznets' (1955) concept of "urbanization" as a determinant of income
inequality, allowing us to test for the effects oflate-stage urbanization on income
inequality in advanced economies.
The research on city size (as measured by population level) and income inequality
was first advanced by Michael Betz (1972) and Irving Hoch (1972) and continued by
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numerous researchers throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Bums, 1975; Farbman, 1975;
Garofalo & Fogarty, 1979; Haworth et al., 1978, 1979; Hirsch, 1982; Kennedy & Nord,
1984; Long et al., 1977; Nord, 1980a, 1980b; Walker, 1979; Yinger & Danziger, 1978).
The tenuous conclusions ofthis body of research (relying heavily on cross-sectional
decennial census data) suggest that the relationship between city size (population level)
and household income inequality is reflected in a curvilinear U-shaped pattern.
Relatively smaller cities appear to experience higher levels of inequality. Cities with
moderate-to-high levels of population appear to experience lower levels of inequality up
to a point. And, beyond some threshold population level, income inequality once again
appears to be higher in the largest of cities. This tentatively supports the theory of
oscillating Kuznets' Curves along the urbanization dimension.
Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain this nonlinear relationship.
Murray (1969) shows that as cities grow in size, median income rises, raising the incomes
of the lower-income households and leading to lower inequality. However, Danziger
(1976), Farbman (1975), and Long et al (1977) show that city size leads to widening skill
differentials in a more diverse urban population mix, which in tum leads to rising
inequality. Bums (1976) however raises a human capital counter-argument suggesting
that as city size increases and population levels rise, opportunities for human capital
development (education and training) will increase in urban areas, raising skills across
the board and leading to a decline in urban inequality.
Haworth et al (1978) posit a "monopoly hypothesis" and argue that the principle
beneficiaries of rising urban size will be those individuals and groups that hold assets and
have monopoly positions in the delivery of goods and services, so that the benefits of
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increasing city size will be unequally distributed, leading to rising inequality.
Specifically, Haworth et al. argue that holders ofland assets will see wealth appreciation
through capital gains resulting from an increase in the population, and that this increase
in wealth will lead to gains in income that will be disproportionate to non-asset holders in
the city, thus creating higher levels of inequality at higher population levels.
Garofalo and Fogarty (1979) advance a "productivity-agglomeration hypothesis."
They argue that the productivity advances resulting from urban agglomeration economies
and spillover knowledge accrue almost fully to higher skilled labor. Thus, productivity
increases with city size due to agglomeration economies, spillovers, and external
economies of scale, but these factors serve to raise the productivity ofhil!h skilled urban
labor only, leaving low skilled urban labor unaffected and resulting in widening
inequality. (Another label for this phenomenon might be "non-neutral skill-biased
agglomeration change.") Garofalo and Fogarty also offer a secondary explanation for
rising inequality and city size, particularly in the largest cities: the "amenitycompensation" theory. Garofalo and Fogarty argue that higher aggregate urban income
leads to a broader tax base and a higher quality of public goods and amenities in the city.
This, in tum, tends to attract higher-skilled labor, initially resulting in an increasing
supply of high-skilled labor that reduces the wage premium for skills and reduces overall
inequality. However, once city population (and income) grow beyond a certain point,
market failures caused by congestion externalities result, and higher-skilled workers must
be compensated for these social costs with a wage premium in order for urban firms to
retain them as employees. Lower-skilled urban labor cannot command this higher wage
premium to compensate for the social costs of congestion, according to Garofalo and
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Fogarty, leading to a rising skilled-unskilled income gap as the city population grows
beyond a certain threshold.
Nord and Kennedy (1984) analyze 167 MSAs using census data from the 1950 to
1970 time period to explore the possible theories on the relationship between city size
and the income distribution. They break city population levels into three ranked size
categories and analyze all three categories for the 1950, 1960 and 1970 decennial
censuses. They control for a number of additional variables as well, and their findings
confirm some of the previous theories on city size and inequality while rejecting others.
In cities over 500,000 in population (the largest of the three class size categories), the
coefficient on city size and household income inequality is positively and statistically
significant. For cities less than 500,000 in size, the coefficient is positively correlated,
but not significant. This tentatively confirms the "monopoly-benefits" theory and the
"amenities-compensation" hypothesis of Garofalo and Fogarty (1979), and suggests that
city size as measured by population level raises inequality, but only in the largest class of
cities. Otherwise, it has little or no effect. For the smaller class of cities, however, the
"human capital" theory of Bums (1975) is tentatively supported, suggesting that as cities
grow in size, opportunities for human capital development become more available,
leading to an increase in the supply of skilled and educated labor and reducing inequality.
Additionally, Nord and Kennedy find that population growth rates in the previous decade
had no statistically significant effect on income inequality in either direction. This
challenges previous research and suggests that urban population growth rates have little
impact on inequality in the lagged time period.
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Based upon the foregoing summary of somewhat inconclusive literature exploring
the relationship between population levels or population growth rates and inequality, the
direction of the relationship between MSAlCMSA population growth rates and the
change in MSAICMSA inequality over the 1990 to 2000 period cannot be predicted a
priori. The indeterminacy of this relationship leads to the following correlational

hypothesis: There is a statistically significant relationship between 1990 to 2000
population growth rates per MSAICMSA and the change in MSAlCMSA household
income inequality from 1990 to 2000.
A summary of the variables included in the second-stage regression are listed in
Table 2, below. The second-stage regression equation is spf'cified in Equation 5,
(5)

c/J

= 80 + 811f/ + 82AI + 83A2 + 84A 3 + 85A 4 + 86A 5 + 87A6
+ 88 A 7 + 89A 8 + J1

where

c/J

is the estimated point change in the Gini coefficient measure of income

inequality per MSAICMSA from 1990 to 2000.

\jf

is real per capita GMP growth (the

dependent variable from the first regression equation), and Al through A8 are control
variables discussed above and listed below. 80 through 89 are predicted coefficients from
the data, and J1 is an error term.
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Table 2: Summary of variables in second-stage regression estimating inequality
Variable Name
estimated point change in Gini index
coefficient 1990-2000
actual (or predicted) % t;. in real per
capita GMP per MSAJCMSA 19902000
t;. in educational inequality per
MSAJCMSA 1990-2000 (t;. in
proportion in extreme tails of the
education distribution)
point change in Massey and Denton's
racial dissimilarity index from 19902000
% t;. in real per capita total transfer
payments per MSAJCMSA from
1990-2000
t;. in proportion of black (including
Hispanic) population per
MSAJCMSA from 1990-2000
t;. in the ratio of female-headed
households to population per
MSAJCMSA from 1990-2000
t;. in proportion of population age 65
and above in MSAJCMSA population
1990-2000
dummy variable for MSAJCMSA in
South Census Region in 1990
% growth in population per
MSAJCMSA 1990-2000
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Expected Correlation

+
+
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Indeterminate

+

+

+

+
Indeterminate

CHAPTER IV
Findings and Analysis
Description ofData and Univariate Analysis
The units of analysis for the present research are Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs) and Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs). MSAs are urban
areas with a population of 50,000 or more in the central city and geographically defined
by the Bureau of Census to include the central city plus the surrounding metropolitan
counties and suburbs. CMSAs are larger super-metropolitan areas comprised of a
grouping of smaller cohesive individual MSAs (called Primary Metropolitan Statistical
Areas or PMSAs). Both MSAs and CMSAs are considered stand-alone urban economies
defined by geographic boundaries determined not by political jurisdictions but by
commuting patterns and the relationship of other economic activity to the central urban
location (Mills & Hamilton, 1994, pp. 5-7).
PMSAs, per se, were excluded from the present study (and the larger CMSA
metropolitan units used instead) because the goal is to analyze single stand-alone
economies uninfluenced by the possible economic spillovers from other cities in close
geographic proximity. The CMSA is thus the preferred economic-geographic unit of
analysis in the largest metropolitan areas (i.e., Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York
City, etc.) where numerous smaller PMSAs may not be so easily analyzed in isolation
due to the potential spillover influence between and among these smaller economic units.
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There were 276 MSAs/CMSAs in the United States as of the 2000 Census. The
Census Bureau was able to provide 1990 and 2000 household income Gini coefficients
for 260 of the total 276 MSAs/CMSAs existing in 2000. 1990 household Gini
coefficients for the remaining sixteen MSAs were not able to be provided because these
urban areas did not exist as a classified MSA in 1990. 33 Because of the problem of
missing values for these sixteen cases, the decision was made to drop them from the
analysis. Despite their relatively new status as MSAs over the 1990 to 2000 time period,
the sixteen cases excluded from the analysis were found to be random relative to most of
the variables in both the first- and second-stage regressions.

34

Because the sixteen cases

droppen comprise less than six percent of the total population of '276 cases., their
exclusion is considered small enough to be of negligible consequence. The findings from
the analysis ofthe remaining 260 cases should be valid and largely unbiased, and the
generalizability of the results should be unaffected.
All other variables are complete and do not suffer from any missing values,
leaving a total sample size of n=260 MSAs/CMSAs for which data are available and
which are thus included in the study.35 The use ofn=260 cases is thought to provide a

The sixteen specific MSAs for which there were missing values on the 1990 Gini coefficient include:
Auburn-Opelika, AL; Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA; Corvallis, OR; Flagstaff, AZ-UT; Goldsboro, NC; Grand
Junction, CO; Greenville, NC; Hattiesburg, MS; Jonesboro, AR; Missoula, MT; Myrtle Beach, SC;
Pocatello, ID; Punta Gorda, FL; Rocky Mount, NC; San Luis Obispo, CA; Sumter, SC.
34 In a simple difference of means (-test of significance, the sixteen excluded cases were found to have
significantly different means (p ::::; .05) on only two variables included in the two separate regression
equations. The sixteen excluded cases exhibited statistically significantly higher means on the percentage
point change in professional-, managerial-, and technical-sector jobs from 1990-2000 and the percentage
point change in the number of elderly 65+ from 1990-2000.
35 One caveat should be mentioned. In calculating the percentage change in per capita utility patent
approvals per MSAlCMSA from 1990-1999 (an independent variable in the first-stage regression), the
author discovered that two MSAs (Jacksonville, NC and McAllen, TX) had zero utility patent approvals in
1990, and one and five utility patent approvals in 1999 respectively, making a percentage rate of increase
calculation impossible for these two cases (computing a percentage change from zero yields an error and
thus a missing value in this variable for these two cases). In order to avoid excluding these two cases, and
because the relative increase in per capita patent approvals was so small for these two cities, the decision
33
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sufficiently large enough sample size for use in standard multiple regression analysis
given the number of independent variables to be included in both the first- and second.

.

stage regressIOn equatIOns.

36

The data for each of the variables were checked for normality, linearity,
homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity before interpreting the results of either of the two
regressions. The two critically important dependent variables were found to be normally
distributed, allowing us to assume that the error terms or residuals are normally
distributed as well, an important criterion of multiple regression analysis (Berry, 1993).
The percentage change in real per capita GMP from 1990 to 2000 (the dependent variable
in the first-stage regression) exhibited slight negative skewness of .. .,492 with a skewness
z-score of -3.26. The point change in the Gini coefficient from 1990 to 2000 (the
dependent variable in the second-stage regression) exhibited minimal positive skewness
of +.068 with a skewness z-score of +.450. 37
The data in all variables were also visually inspected for linearity and
homoscedasticity using bivariate scatterplots ofthe relationships between all independent

was made to arbitrarily set the percentage increase in per capita utility patent approvals at 0 percent for
McAllen, TX (from 0 in 1990 to 5 patents in 1999), and at 0 percent for Jacksonville, NC (from 0 in 1990
to 1 patent in 1999).
36 Tabachnick and Fidell (2001, p. 117) suggest that the ratio of cases to independent variables can follow a
simple rule-of-thumb formula: N 2: 50 + 8m (where m is the number of independent variables). With 260
cases, this rule of thumb would permit a maximum of m = 26 independent variables in either of the
multivariate regression equations. Neither regression equation in the present study includes this many
independent variables.
37 All skewness z-scores were calculated by dividing the skewness statistic by its standard error. A
skewness z-score between ±2.33 is considered good, and a skewness z-score between ±2.33 and ±3.29 is
considered marginal but acceptable (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001, p. 67). The distribution of both
dependent variables are within this range of acceptance, indicating only a slight or moderate deviation from
normality in this data. The decision was made not to log or otherwise transform these variables due to the
relatively large sample size and the assumptions of normality that can be made with larger samples.
Additionally, the degree of skewness in these two dependent variables is not considered severe enough to
warrant a transformation of the data that would render interpretation of the results more difficult. Retaining
the data in these variables in their untransformed state was thought to be an acceptable tradeoff to ease of
interpretation. See Tabachnick and Fidell (2001, pp. 72-77), for further discussion of the assumptions of
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variables and the dependent variable in each regression. Based upon a visual inspection
of these scatterplots, there do not appear to be any nonlinear relationships. Where a
bivariate pattern between the dependent and independent variables is evident, it appears
to be linear. Other scatterplots where patterns are not evident reveal slight
heteroscedasticity but no curvilinearity. Heteroscedasticity problems were not severe
enough to warrant a transformation of the relevant variables, and multiple regression and
correlation analysis is thought to be a robust enough statistical technique to overcome
moderate heteroscedasticity and still render valid results.

Table 3: Univariate statistics for selected variables
Median
Mean *
24.2 (4.1)
1990 real GMP (billions) **
7.3
2000 real GMP lbillions)
1990 per capita GMP **
2000 per capita GMP
1990 Gini coefficient
2000 Gini coefficient
1990 total population
2000 total population

32.3 (5.2)
28,620 (5,983)
34,310 (6,684)
.4291 (.0251)
.4429 (.0251)
756,468
(1,817,842)
861,317
(2,020,748)
0.00016 (0.00013)
0.00024 (0.00028)
41,023 (6,590)
40,860 (6,158)
20.4 (8.6)
55.4 (98.0)
1.6 (0.93)
2.5 (1.1)
0.0138 (0.0101)
-0.1 (5.3)
-2.3 (1.5)
-0.061 (0.054)
24.4 (10.6)
0.50 (1.08)
0.35 (0.28)
0.30 (0.88)
13.3 (12.3)
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10.3
28,131
34,274
.4278
.4419
260,490

Minimum
1.5
1.7
12,310
16,627
.3688
.3794
56,735

Maximum
751.7
940.6
61,121
59,026
.5141
.5179
19,549,615

298,046

57,813

21,199,865

1990 patents per capita
0.00012
0
1999 patents per capita
0.00016
0
40,427
24,591
1989 median hhld. inc. **
1999 median hhld. inc. **
39,897
25,699
20.8
-19.5
% !:l per capita GMP
-100.0
34.8
% !:l utility patent per capita
-0.87
1.5
!:l in % tech. & prof. jobs
2.6
-0.53
!:l in % pop. 4-yr. degree +
0.0130
-0.0167
point !:l Gini coefficient
-0.3
-14.4
% !:l median hhld. income
-2.4
-6.4
!:l in % educ. inequality
point !:l dissimilarity index
-00400
-0.052
-0.8
% !:l per capita transfer pmt.
23.8
0.31
!:l in % black population
-3.45
!:l in % female HOH
0.33
-0.40
0.28
!:l in % population 65 +
-2.31
12.0
-7.4
% !:l total population
* standard deviations are in parentheses
** Note: all dollar values are expressed as constant, inflation-adjusted 2000 dollars

0.00086
0.00253
65,374
64,109
42.1
812.1
4.69
6.06
0.0502
16.6
3.8
0.050
83.3
6.38
1.33
3.26
83.3

univariate nonnality in regression analysis. See also Berry (1993, pp. 6-12), Gujarati (1995, pp. 101-107),
and Kennedy (1997, pp. 42-47).
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Table 3, above, reveals relevant univariate statistics on selected variables
including means, standard deviations, medians, and minimum and maximum values.
The mean level of real GMP rose over the decade, as did the mean level of real
GMP per capita. It is noteworthy (but not necessarily surprising) that the top five cities
with the highest levels of real GMP were the same in 2000 as they were in 1990, and
were ranked in the same order at the end of the decade as at the beginning: 1) New York,
NY, 2) Los Angeles, CA, 3) Chicago, IL, 4) San Francisco, CA, and 5) Washington,
D.C.-Baltimore, MD (all CMSAs). Additionally, three ofthe five metropolitan areas
with the lowest real GMP levels in 1990 were also ranked in the bottom five metropolitan
areas in this category in 2000: Enid, OK; Great Falls, MT; and Pine Bluff, AR. (Enid,
OK, had the lowest level of real GMP in both Census years.)
A similar pattern appears when we look at the rankings of per capita real GMP
from 1990 to 2000. Four of the top five metropolitan areas ranking highest in per capita
real GMP in 1990 were also in the top five in this category in 2000: Hartford, CT;
Pittsfield, MA; Roanoke, VA; and Springfield, IL. Three of the five lowest ranked cities
in per capita real GMP in 1990 were also among the five lowest in 2000: Jacksonville,
NC; Las Cruces, NM; and Yuma, AZ. Taken together, this would seem to suggest that
while mean economic growth increased over the decade (as measured by either the level
of real GMP or per capita real GMP), there were few changes in the rankings of
metropolitan areas during that time.
Perhaps the most interesting finding revealed in Table 3 is that while real per
capita GMP appears to have increased rather substantially on average from 1990 to 2000,

38 For each of the two regression models, a formal Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test ofheteroscedasticity was
conducted (see Gujarati, 1995, pp. 377-378). The null hypothesis ofhomoscedasticity could not be rejected
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real median household income remained constant or declined just slightly on average
over this period. What specifically explains the deviation between these two similar
measures of income is unknown. However, as mentioned earlier in this study, there is a
positive bivariate correlation between the percentage change in real per capita GMP from
1990 to 2000 and the percentage change in real median household income from 1989 to
1999, and the relationship is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level
(p-value ~ .001). This suggests that these two measures of income (one per capita, the
other per household) are capturing similar effects or are measuring roughly similar
patterns of output and/or income. Frequency distributions and skewness statistics for
these measures indicate that they are both normally distributed with very few outliers or
extreme values. We can only conclude that while real per capita output rose, on average,
rather substantially over the decade, real median household income appears to have
stagnated. This may be so for several reasons.
First, this apparent anomaly may be a function of the way in which these two
variables have been computed and/or the specific differences in what they are measuring:
median household income versus per capita production output. Second, surges in
immigration into U.S. metropolitan areas by low-income Hispanic families over the
decade may be responsible for putting downward pressure on median household income.
The purported and widely acknowledged increase in low-income Hispanic immigration
over the 1990s may have kept real median household income growth down even as
output per capita rose over the same period (Brookings Institution, 2001). Finally, the
decline in household size may explain the fall in real median household income alongside
a rise in real per capita GMP. Census Bureau data show that the mean household size in

even at a low 90 percent confidence level in either regression, confinning homoscedasticity of the data.
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1990 was 2.63, while dropping to 2.59 in 2000, a decline of 1.5 percent over the decade.

39

This decline in the number of members in the household, and thus the number of earners
contributing to household income, would tend to reduce median household income over
this period even if real individual earnings and/or per capita GMP were rising. At any
rate, the finding seems to suggest that, for a variety of possible reasons, the potential
labor earnings from per capita output are not reflected in the measure on median
household income despite the statistically significant positive correlation found between
the two measures.
The percentage change in per capita utility patent approvals as a measure of
technological change is positively skewed by some metropolitan areas with a very large
jump in utility patents, as suggested by the data in Table 3 (most notably Boise, ID, and
Killeen, TX, with 812 percent and 553 percent rates of growth, respectively).
Nonetheless, the data seem to indicate that, on average, the u.s. Patent Office approved
more utility patents in 1999 than in 1990. Theoretically, this may be a result of at least
two factors: 1) there were relatively more unique discoveries and inventions in 1999 than
in 1990; and/or 2) the u.s. Patent Office became more lenient in granting utility patent
approvals over the decade. We have no obvious evidence that the U.s. Patent Office
made significant changes to the way in which it awarded utility patent grants from 1990
to 1999 (Nunn and Worgan, 2002; Worgan and Nunn, 2002), so we can reasonably
conclude that technological progress or some other exogenous factor led to an increase in
metropolitan innovations and discoveries from 1990 to 1999 (see also Wessel, 2003).
Other findings in Table 3 generally reveal expected trends and patterns in the
data. Household income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient rose modestly
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Data from U.S. Census Bureau Census 1990 Summary File 3 and Census 2000 Summary File 3.
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over the decade as suggested by other research (Ryscavage, 1999). A detailed
investigation of the data on inequality reveals no distinct pattern of the metropolitan areas
with either the highest or the lowest changes in the Gini coefficient. The two
metropolitan areas with the highest Gini coefficient in 1990, Bryan, TX, and Naples, FL,
are also ranked first and second, accordingly, in 2000. However, beyond this similarity
in the Gini coefficient rankings, no other obvious trends or patterns appear.
Metropolitan population increased strongly over the decade but at rates that we
would expect (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001), reflecting the continuing trends toward
urbanization and suburbanization and away from rural life. Again, as discovered for
other variables, there doe,,· not appear to have heen a noticeable degree of change in the
rankings over the decade. The five metropolitan areas with the highest population levels
were the same in 1990 and 2000, and were ranked in the same sequence: 1) New York,
NY, 2) Los Angeles, CA, 3) Chicago, IL, 4) Washington, D.C.-Baltimore, MD, and 5)
San Francisco, CA. Likewise, at the other end of the spectrum, the bottom five
metropolitan areas with the lowest levels of population were the same in 2000 as in 1990:
Casper, WY; Cheyenne, WY; Enid, OK; Great Falls, WY; and Victoria, TX.
The number of metropolitan professional- or technology-related jobs and the
number of people with a higher education also increased over the decade, reflecting gains
in human capital and the rise in skilled occupational positions in the metropolitan labor
force. The metropolitan areas that exhibited the largest increases in the proportion of
skilled labor and education categories over the decade were found almost exclusively in
the Midwest, South and East, including cities such as Lawrence, KS, BloomingtonNormal, IL, Wausau, WI, Wilmington, NC, Portland, ME, and Burlington, VT.

76

As life spans continue to increase, we would expect to find an increase in the
elderly population aged 65 and above. And, as the population becomes more diverse, we
would also expect to see an increase in African-American population levels. Both of
these expectations are confirmed in Table 3. Additionally, as the African-American
population in metropolitan areas has increased, we observe a moderate decline in blacknonblack housing segregation, on average, as reflected in the drop in the dissimilarity
index. This further confirms the work of Glaeser and Vigdor (200 1) who also find an
overall drop in dissimilarity indexes across a large majority of metropolitan areas. The
metropolitan areas with the largest increases in the dissimilarity index (and by extension
the largest increase in racial housing segregation) are found in the Southeast and
Northeast: Biloxi, MS, Cumberland, MD, Hickory, NC, Jacksonville, NC, and New
London-Norwich, CT-RI. The metropolitan areas with the largest declines in the
dissimilarity index over the decade are located primarily in the Southwest and West:
Brownsville, TX, Great Falls, MT, Laredo, TX, and Provo-Orem, UT. This also
confirms the research by Glaeser and Vigdor who find relatively higher dissimilarity
indexes in older eastern cities, and relatively lower dissimilarity indexes in younger
western cities.
Educational inequality (the proportion ofthe metropolitan population with either a
graduate degree or less than a high school diploma or equivalent) appears to have
declined somewhat, on average, over the decade, perhaps owing to fewer individuals in
the bottom of the educational distribution with less than a high school education. Indeed,
the median number of individuals per MSAlCMSA with less than a high school diploma
declined by 10.4 percent from 1990 to 2000, even as the median number of individuals
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per MSAlCMSA with a graduate degree increased by 41.3 percent. Because the former
category is a much larger segment of MSAlCMSA population than the latter category, its
drop had a greater impact on the overall distribution of education, thus explaining the
convergence we see in education levels in Table 3.

Effects o/Technological Change on Per Capita Economic Growth
Table 4 summarizes the findings on the relationship between each independent
variable in Equation 4 and the growth rate of real per capita GMP from 1990 to 2000,
including partial coefficients with their standard errors, t-values, significance levels and

R2 coefficient of determination. An analysis of the findings follows the table.
Table 4: Summary of regression coefficients estimating real per capita GMP growth
rates, 1990-2000 (standard errors are in parentheses, t-values in brackets)
Modell
16.434
.006
(.OOS)
[1.198]
S.362***
(.6S2)
[8.22S]
-1. 732***

y-intercept (constant)
% 11 per capita utility patent approvals 1990-2000

11 in proportion of population in prof. / mgmt. /
tech. jobs 1990-2000
11 in proportion of population with a 4-yr. degree
or more 1990-2000

(.S47)
[-3.169]
-.023
(.039)

% 11 total population 1990-2000

[-.S89]
20.980
.248
.236
260

F
R2
adjusted R2
n
*** significance level p < .01
** significance level p < .OS
* significance level p < .10

Model 2
18.307
.012**
(.OOS)
[2.203]

I.OS4**
(.482)
[2.188]
-.093**
(.043)
[-2.144]
4.302
.048
.037
260

Model 1 is the complete model including all four independent variables. Model 2
removes the secondary measure of technological change measuring the change in the
proportion of professional-, managerial- and technological-sector occupations since this
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variable appears to be so strong that it masks (or distorts) the independent effects of the
other three variables in Modell.
Clearly, Modell is the strongest ofthe two models. As indicated by the
coefficient of determination, changes in the combination of the four independent
variables in this model explain roughly one quarter of the variation in real per capita
GMP growth from 1990 to 2000. Additionally, the secondary measure oftechnological
change (the change in the proportion of the population in professional- or technologysector jobs) is clearly the strongest and most statistically significant predictor of real per
capita GMP, and the sign on the coefficient is in the expected positive direction. The
coefficient on this variable indicates that a one percentage point increase in the
proportion of the metropolitan population employed in professional-, managerial- or
technology-sector jobs raises real per capita GMP by more than five percent over the
decade. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis that no relationship exists, and assert
that there is a statistically significant positive association between the growth rate in the
proportion of the metropolitan population in high-skilled occupations and the growth rate
in real per capita metropolitan economic output.
Florida (2004) argues that growing cities are marked by an increasing contingent
of professionals who generate new technologies and new ideas through networks of
creativity within an urban economy. He suggests that this "creative class" of workers,
instilled with a high level of diversity, individuality, intelligence, education, drive, and
creativity, are one ofthe primary forces behind why some urban and regional economies
experience rapid development and economic growth. The results found in Table 4 can be
interpreted as a (tentative) confirmation of this theory if we accept that the variable
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measuring proportionate changes in technical and professional occupations captures some
ofthis "creative class," which is plausible.
Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 reveal two unexpected findings and one apparent
anomaly. First, the primary variable measuring technological change (the growth rate in
per capita utility patent approvals) is only weakly related to real per capita economic
growth in the expected positive direction. Second, population growth is found to be
significantly and negatively correlated with the growth rate in real per capita output in
Model 2, opposite the expected positive relationship. And, finally, the sign on the
coefficient of the variable measuring the growth rate in the proportion of the population
with a four-year degree Of more changes from negative (unexpected) to positive
(expected) between the two models, but remains statistically significant in both. In
Model 1, the coefficient on the educational attainment variable indicates that a one
percentage point increase in the proportion of the metropolitan population with a fouryear degree or above is significantly correlated with a 1.7 percent drop in real per capita
GMP. Yet, in Model 2, with the secondary measure of technological change omitted, the
coefficient on the educational attainment variable indicates that a one percentage point
increase in the proportion of the metropolitan population with a four-year degree or
above is significantly correlated with a one percent increase in real per capita GMP.
These findings are discussed in more detail below.

Table 4 indicates that the primary variable measuring technological change (the
percentage change in per capita utility patent approvals per MSAlCMSA, 1990 to 1999)
is, at best, weakly related to the metropolitan growth rate in real per capita output in the
expected (positive) direction. Even then, the correlation is significant only under
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conditions where the measure on occupational change is omitted in Model 2. And,
Model 2 is relatively weak with a coefficient of determination of just .04, indicating that
changes in the three independent variables retained in this model explain less than five
percent of the variation in metropolitan per capita economic output, even though each of
the three independent variables are statistically significant. The coefficient on the patent
per capita measure oftechnological change indicates that a one percentage point increase
in per capita utility patent approvals is correlated with only a .01 percent increase in real
per capita GMP from 1990 to 2000; not a large impact. Patent data thus appear to be a
weak predictor of economic growth in metropolitan areas, at least over the time period
investigated here. This i~~ an important finding. This weak or negligible association
between patent data and economic growth may result for several reasons.
First, while utility patent grants may be a good indicator of inventiveness or
entrepreneurship in urban areas (Higgs, 1971), or may give good indications of
metropolitan technological spillovers in close geographic proximity (Carlino, 2001;
Higgs, 1971; Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993), they may simply be a poor predictor
of economic growth. As a measure of technological change, utility patent data apparently
do not correlate well with real per capita output in metropolitan areas. This does not
imply that the findings presented here are in contradiction to the uses of patent data as
measures of inventiveness or technological spillovers in the previous research cited
above. Patent data may measure variations in these concepts quite well, yet fail to
perform well as a predictor of economic growth. Not all inventive activities necessarily
create economic growth (Griliches, 1990).
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Second, utility patents approved at a given geographic location may not have any
growth-inducing impact at that location. This is consistent with one ofthe major
critiques of the use of patent data by Griliches (1990). The growth impacts of the
inventions linked to utility patent approvals, ifthere are any, might be felt at an entirely
different geographic location. The metropolitan area to which the utility patent approval
is assigned may not benefit economically from the invention to which the patent is
linked, particularly if the patented invention is more productive or useful in an industry
that is unrelated to the industry to which the original patent was granted. The industry
that generates the patented invention may not be the industry that uses the patented
invention, If S(l, then the patented invention may generate no observab1e economic
benefits for the geographic location to which the utility patent was originally granted or
assigned. There may be a disconnect between the industry and location where the patent
was originally granted and the industry and location where the patented invention is
actually used, making it difficult to trace the economic benefits from patented inventions
using only geographically-based per capita utility patent approval rates.
Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) attempt to trace the effects of patents
geographically to understand how patent approvals in one period and in one location
affect patent approvals in a later period at that same location. These authors find that
later patents tend to emanate from geographic locations that are in close proximity to the
previous patents they cite (or to which they are linked in terms of their inventive
genealogy), suggesting self-reinforcing inventiveness due to localized technological
spillovers. However, this says nothing about the impact of successive patents on the level
or rate of growth in economic output at those geographic locations. One can easily
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hypothesize two distinct metropolitan economies in different locations. One economy
engages in large amounts of R&D and generates many new patented inventions.
Perhaps a research university is located within its boundaries or it is characterized as an
incubator economy or "nursery city" (Duranton & Puga, 2001). The other metropolitan
area simply imports the inventions and ideas generated by the first, putting them to use
increasing productivity and the output of goods and services. Indeed, Duranton and Puga
argue that many cities can be characterized by one of the two alternatives suggested in
this scenario, depending upon the stage of product life cycles. In this scenario, it is
reasonable to assume that measures of economic growth such as the growth rate in per
capita GMP would register stronger output growth in the second economy than in the
first. Perhaps it is for this reason that the findings in Table 4 do not reveal a strong
relationship between per capita patent approval rates and the rate of per capita economic
growth in metropolitan economies over the 1990s.
Finally, as Griliches (1990) also points out, there is much inventive activity that is
not patented due to concerns over trade secrecy and innovation concealment between
rivals. Perhaps inventive activity that is not patented (and thus concealed) has a much
greater impact on economic output in a given geographic location than do the patented
inventions in these same locations. If so, this would further explain the weak association
between utility patent approvals and per capita economic growth in metropolitan
economies that we find here.
As discussed above, the second variable measuring technological change (the
change in the proportion ofprofessional-, managerial-, and technology-sector
occupations per MSAlCMSA, 1990 to 2000) is positively and significantly related to the
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growth rate in real per capita output, as expected, and has a much stronger influence than
the growth rate in utility patent approvals. The occupational change variable may simply
do a better job of capturing the concept of technological change than the patent data
variable. In fact, as indicated in a comparison of Model 1 and Model 2, the strength and
significance of this variable eliminates any relationship between the growth rates in per
capita utility patent approvals and real per capita GMP. When controlling for the change
in the proportion of the population with a professional-, managerial-, or technologyrelated occupation from 1990 to 2000, the percentage change in per capita utility patent
approvals fails to be significantly correlated with the growth rate in per capita GMP. The
apparent relationship between real per capita GMP growth rates ami the fir<;t measure of
technological change (per capita utility patent approvals) found in Model 2 is likely a
result of omitted variable bias: it disappears once we control for the effects of skilled
occupational change.
This stronger association between the occupational measure of technological
change and per capita economic growth may result for several reasons. First,
metropolitan labor market composition is itself a function of GMP given the
methodology used by the BEA in computing GMP (see above explanation). If GMP is
derived from GSP (gross state product) and assigned back to metropolitan areas based
upon the proportion of metropolitan workers in distinct industrial categories, then
changes in GMP should be logically related to changes in labor market composition.
Thus, it is not surprising to find a correlation.
Further, labor market measures are geographically fixed and thus not separable
from their metropolitan location. Where patented inventions in one area can be easily
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drawn into use at another location, labor market occupational change is fixed to the
geographic area by which it is defined. Thus, it should be expected to relate to changes
in economic growth in that metropolitan area.
The second unexpected finding in Table 4 pertains to the effects of population
growth on per capita output. As revealed in Model 2, while the patent and education
measures exhibit the expected positive sign on the coefficient, the population growth rate
variable is negatively correlated with real per capita GMP growth, a somewhat
unexpected finding. Model 2 suggests that when controlling for the effects of per capita
utility patent growth rates and proportionate changes in educational attainment, a one
percent increase in population growth leads to a .09 percent decline in the growth rate of
real per capita GMP from 1990 to 2000. While this is not a large effect, it is statistically
significant, and the direction of the relationship is intriguing.
One explanation for the negative relationship found between growth rates in
population and real per capita economic output may be congestion externalities and/or a
deficiency in the rate of growth in public infrastructure in metropolitan areas
experiencing relatively higher population growth. That is, metropolitan areas with high
rates of population growth from 1990 to 2000 may have experienced congestion
externalities and other spillover costs associated with rapid growth that, in tum, slowed
the rate of growth in real per capita output. If this explains the negative relationship
between per capita output and population growth, it would question conclusions reached
in previous research on the relationship between city size, city growth, and income and
productivity (Hoch, 1972, and Sveikauskas, 1975).
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A second and equally plausible explanation is simply that population growth rates
exceeded the growth rates in real GMP over this period. Because real GMP per capita
depends not only upon the level of real GMP in its determination, but also upon
population levels, metropolitan areas where decennial population grew rapidly would
have had greater difficulty increasing real per capita GMP; even if the overall level of
real economic output was rising, the denominator was simply rising faster than the
numerator in the GMP-to-population ratio.
However, this theory is difficult to rectify with the univariate findings in Table 3
where both the mean and median growth rate in real per capita GMP outpaced the mean
and median growth rate in metropolitan population over th~ decade. As Table 3
indicates, the median growth rate in real per capita GMP from 1990 to 2000 was 20.8
percent while the median metropolitan population growth rate was 12 percent. The
negative relationship between population growth rates and real per capita GMP growth
rates in Table 4 cannot be reconciled simply by reference to "the denominator rising
faster than the numerator in the GMP-to-population ratio." Indeed, further investigation
of the data reveals that conditions were just the opposite. Median real GMP in 1990 was
approximately $7.3 billion (in constant 2000 dollars), and median real GMP in 2000 was
$10.5 billion, a rate of increase in the median level of real GMP equal to 43.8 percent.
On the other hand, the median population level in 1990 stood at 260,490, and the median
population level by 2000 had risen only 14.4 percent to 298,046.
Clearly, then, real economic output rose, on average, by a larger magnitude than
population levels over the decade, meaning that the negative relationship found between
population growth rates and per capita output growth rates is not a function of population
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levels rising faster than real output levels. Something else is going on, and explaining the
inverse relationship between population growth rates and per capita economic output
growth rates found here provides fertile ground for future research. One place to begin
would be the theory suggested above: fast-growing metropolitan populations may
experience slower per capita economic growth due to congestion externalities and/or an
insufficient growth rate in public goods and public infrastructure necessary to support
rapid population growth. In either case, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no
correlation between population growth rates and the growth rate in real per capita GMP.
Finally, the apparent anomaly in Table 4 is the change in the sign on the
coefficient for the measure of growth in educational attainment between Modell and
Model 2. The dominant influence ofthe professional- and technology-sector job change
variable in Modell, combined with the unexpected negative sign on the educational
attainment variable, led to the subsequent regression omitting the occupational change
variable, the results of which are shown in Model 2. Interestingly, when utility patents
per capita and population growth rates are held constant in Model 2, the change in the
proportion of the population with a four-year degree or more becomes positively and
significantly related to per capita GMP, just as human capital theory would predict (i.e.,
an increase in overall education level should raise labor productivity and thus per capita
economic growth). A one percentage point increase in the proportion of the metropolitan
population with a four-year degree or more is significantly associated with a roughly one
percent increase in the growth rate of real per capita GMP, significant at the 95 percent
confidence level. When the occupational change variable is omitted, the change in the
proportion of the population with higher educational attainment switches from being
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negatively and significantly correlated to per capita output in Model 1 to positively and

significantly related to per capita output in Model 2, as we would expect. This is
somewhat surprising, but may be a result of nothing more than the relatively high
statistical collinearity between these two independent variables in Modell. The change
in the proportion ofthe population in professiona1- or technology-sector jobs and the
change in the proportion of the population with a four-year degree or more were found to
exhibit relatively high positive collinearity. The Pearson's r coefficient of correlation
between these two variables is .604, and the correlation is positive and statistically
significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level (p < .001). The dominance of the
occupational change variahle in the model may cause the sign on the educational
attainment variable to become negative in Model 1.40
Based upon Table 4, we can make the following tentative conclusions regarding
the relationship between educational attainment and per capita economic growth: The
change in the proportion of the metropolitan population with a four-year degree or more
from 1990 to 2000 (employed as a measure of human capital development) is statistically
significantly related to real per capita GMP growth rates, but the relationship is

40 This discovery suggests a possible interaction between changes in the proportion of metropolitan
professional-, managerial- and technology-sector occupations and changes in the proportion of
metropolitan educational attainment. That is, professional- and technology-sector occupational changes
may play an indirect role in determining the influence of educational attainment on real per capita GMP
growth rates. If so, there may be an interaction between the proportionate change in professional and
technology jobs per MSA and the proportionate change in the MSA population with a bachelor's degree or
more, such that the change in educational attainment exhibits a greater or lesser impact on real per capita
GMP growth rates conditional on the proportionate rise or fall in technology-sector occupations. This
theory was tested by creating a continuous-by-continuous interaction term to determine the level of
influence that the educational attainment growth rate exerts upon real per capita GMP at various levels of
professional-, managerial- and technology-sector occupational change. The interaction term was found to
be statistically significant but with a negative sign, further confounding any plausible interpretation of the
effects of growth in educational attainment on per capita economic growth rates. The most appealing
conclusion, therefore, is that growth in educational attainment has a small positive impact on economic
growth that can only be observed when the occupational change variable is excluded from the model due to
collinearity concerns.
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contingent on changes in the proportion of the population in professional-, managerial- or
technology-intensive jobs. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis that there is a zero
correlation between growth in the proportion of the metropolitan labor force with a
higher education and per capita economic growth rates. Yet, the correlation found in
Model 1 is at odds with expectations, and likely a result of statistical collinearity between
educational change and skilled occupational change. The (minor) positive effect of
changes in educational attainment on real per capita GMP, then, is perhaps best indicated
by Model 2.

The Question of Endogeneity: Per Capita Growth and Household Inequality
As mentioned in the literature review above, some researchers have suggested that
economic growth is endogenous in a model of income inequality. Moreover, it has also
been suggested that a more plausible direction of causation would run from inequality to
economic growth, rather than from economic growth to inequality, as posited by the
Kuznets Hypothesis. To repeat this theory briefly, the most popular argument is based
upon the median voter theory of income distribution applied primarily to developing
economies. Tfthe income distribution is positively skewed and income inequality is
relatively high, then the median voter is likely to be found in the lower half of the income
distribution and will tend to vote for growth-retarding transfer payments paid for by taxes
on capital investment. On the other hand, if the income distribution is less positively
skewed or normally distributed, income inequality would tend to be relatively low. In
this scenario, the median voter would be more likely to be in the upper half of the income
distribution, and thus less likely to vote for growth-retarding taxation of capital
investment. The conclusions of this research, then, suggest that (developing) economies
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with relatively low inequality in period t will exhibit relatively higher levels of economic
growth in subsequent time period t+ 1, while economies with higher inequality in the
earlier period will see slower or negative growth in the subsequent period (see especially
Allesina & Rodrik, 1994, and Persson & Tabellini, 1994).
To test this theory on (developed) u.s. metropolitan economies and to ensure that
the growth-to-inequality causal relationship assumption of the Kuznets Hypothesis is
correct (since it is this assumption on which the present analysis rests), the endogeneity
of metropolitan household income inequality and metropolitan economic growth was
tested using Hausman's specification test for simultaneity (see Gujarati, 1995, and
Hausman, 1976). This test fits with the methodology used in the present analysis, and is
the basis for the two-stage standard least-squares technique used here.

41

The predicted values of the growth rate in per capita real GMP and the residuals
from the first-stage regression (Equation 2)

(2)
were saved and inserted into the second-stage regression estimating the change in
household income inequality (Equation 3).
(3)

For a two-stage least-squares regression, the Hausman specification test tests the endogeneity between
the dependent variable in the first-stage regression and the dependent variable in the second-stage
regression when the dependent variable in the first-stage equation will be used as a predictor in the secondstage equation. The residual and the predicted values of the dependent variable from the first-stage
equation are inserted into the second-stage equation, and the second-stage regression is run. If the residual
from the first-stage regression is found to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable in
the second-stage equation, then the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity must be rejected. That is, if
the residual from the first-stage regression is statistically significant, then the residual and the actual values
of the dependent variable from the first-stage equation are endogenous with the dependent variable in the
second-stage equation, and two-way causality is possible. If this is the case, then the predicted value of the
dependent variable (as opposed to the actual values) from the first-stage equation must be employed as
predictors in estimating the dependent variable in the second-stage regression. On the other hand, if the
first-stage residual is not found to be statistically significant in the second-stage regression, then the null
41
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Equation 6 is a modified version of Equation 3 which includes the predicted value of the
"-

per capita real GMP growth rate (ljI) and the residual (X) from the first-stage regression
of Equation 2:42
"-

(6)

l/J =

eo + e1ljl + e2X + e3A + v

Table 5, below, summarizes the results of the regression on Equation 6 including partial
unstandardized coefficients with their standard errors, t-values, significance levels and R2
coefficient of determination:

hypothesis of no endogeneity can be accepted, and the actual values of the dependent variable from the
first-stage equation may be used to estimate the dependent variable in the second-stage regression.
42 In the methodology description, above, the 1990-to-2000 metropolitan population growth rate is listed as
a predictor variable in both the first-stage and second-stage regression equations. Its use as a predictor of
per capita real GMP growth rates in the first-stage model could result in specification errors when also
included in the second-stage model testing for simultaneity, because the predicted value of the per capita
real GMP growth rate is itself included as an estimator of the change in metropolitan household income
inequality. Thus, to avoid potential specification errors in the Hausman's simultaneity test, the
metropolitan population growth rate variable was excluded. As discussed below, the results for the
Hausman test show no endogeneity or simultaneity problems between per capita real GMP growth rates
and changes in metropolitan household income inequality, permitting the re-insertion of the population
growth rate variable into the full second-stage model (because the actual values, rather than the predicted
values, of per capita real GMP growth rates will be used as a predictor in the second-stage estimating
equation).
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Table 5: Summary of regression coefficients from Hausman's test of simultaneity between
per capita real GMP growth rates and changes in metropolitan household income
inequality (standard errors are in parentheses, t-values in brackets)
y-intercept (constant)
predicted value of per capita real GMP growth rate 1990-2000 from
first-stage regression
residual of per capita real GMP growth rate 1990-2000 from first-stage
regression
proportionate Do in educational inequality 1990-2000

point change in dissimilarity index 1990-2000

% Do in per capita total real transfer payments 1990-2000

Do in proportion of black population (including Hispanic) 1990-2000

Do in ratio of female heads-of-household to population 1990-2000

Do in proportion of elderly population age 65+ 1990-2000

dummy for South census region

F

R2
adjusted R2

n

Model 3
.0251
-.0005***
(.000)
[-2.903]
-.0001
(.000)
[-.657]
.0005
(.000)
[1.225]
.0311**
(.012)
[2.522]
.0001
(.000)
[.615]
-.0001
(.001)
[-.183]
.0013
(.003)
[.441]
.0011
(.001)
[ 1.231]
-.0023
(.002)
[-1.516]
3.776
.120
.088
260

*** significance level p < .01
** significance level p < .05
* significance level p < .10
As Table 5 reveals, the coefficient on the residual of per capita real GMP growth
from the first-stage regression is not significant, allowing us to accept the null hypothesis
that no endogeneity or simultaneity exists between the predicted or actual values of per
capita real GMP growth and metropolitan household income inequality. That is, the
changes in household income inequality are uncorrelated with the error term in the firststage equation, ruling out the possibility of simultaneity between changes in metropolitan
household income inequality and changes in per capita real GMP from 1990 to 2000. We
can tentatively conclude, then, that endogeneity between economic growth and changes
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in income inequality is not evident in U.S. metropolitan economies, and that the direction
of causation between the two variables may be assumed to run from growth to inequality
in this data. This permits us to reject the inequality-to-growth direction of causation
suggested by the median voter theory, at least for U.S. metropolitan economies in the
1990s.

43

This finding also allows us to proceed with the test of the relationship between

growth and inequality assumed in the extended or reformulated Kuznets Curve
Hypothesis: at different stages of economic development and growth, economic growth
may exert a different causal influence on income inequality.

Effects of Per Capita Growth on Changes in Household Income Inequality
Table 6 summarizes the findings for the second-stage regression on Equation 5
estimating the effect of changes in economic growth on changes in household income
inequality from 1990 to 2000 in metropolitan areas, including partial unstandardized
coefficients with their standard errors, t-values, significance levels and R2 coefficient of
determination. Model 4 is the full second-stage regression model including all predictors.
Model 5 repeats the second-stage regression but without the inclusion of the unrelated
predictor variables in Model 4. A discussion of the results follows the table.

43

This is consistent with the findings by Forbes (2000) and Partridge (1997). See also Block (2000).
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Table 6: Summary of regression coefficients estimating changes in the metropolitan
household Gini index, 1990-2000 (standard errors are in parentheses, t-values in
brackets)
y-intercept (constant)
% !l actual per capita real GMP 1990-2000

proportionate !l in educational inequality 1990-2000

point change in dissimilarity index 1990-2000

% !l in per capita total real transfer payments 1990-2000

!l in proportion of black population 1990-2000

!l in ratio of female heads-of-household to population 1990-2000

A in proportion of elderly population age 65

I

1990-2000

dummy for South census region

% population growth rate 1990-2000

F

R2
adjusted R2

n

Model 4
.0236
-.0002**
(.000)
[-2.087]
.0014***
(.000)
[2.754]
.0245*
(.013)
[1.951]
-.0001
(.000)
[-.430]
-.0004
(.001)
[-.628]
.0016
(.003)
[.571]
.0012
(.001)
[1.367]
.0010
(.002)
[.605]
-.0002***
(.000)
[-2.661]
4.019
.126
.095
260

ModelS
.0244
-.0002**
(.000)
[-2.395]
.0014***
(.000)
[3.218]
.0272**
(.012)
[2.302]

-.0002***
(.000)
[-3.312]
8.164
.114
.100
260

*** significance level p < .01
** significance level p < .05
* significance level p < .10

The most important result in Table 6 is the coefficient revealing the association
between the growth rate of real per capita GMP and the point change in the household
Gini index. While the relationship between changes in real per capita economic growth
and household income inequality is found to be statistically significant at the 95 percent
confidence level (p ::::: .05), the negative sign on the coefficient is opposite expectations.
The results summarized in Table 6 indicate that a one percent increase in real per capita
GMP from 1990 to 2000 leads to a decline in the Gini index measure of household
income inequality of roughly .0002 points over this same time period. In other words,
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ceteris paribus, an increase in real per capita economic growth at the metropolitan level
leads to a modest decline in household income inequality, which contradicts the theory
that growth and inequality are positively correlated due to technological and structural
changes in post-industrial economies. On the contrary, the data used here suggest that
real economic growth is significantly but negatively correlated with household income
inequality in metropolitan economies over the 1990s, supporting similar findings by
Wheeler (2004) for the 1970 to 1990 period. We can reject the null hypothesis that there
is no correlation between changes in real per capita economic growth and changes in
household inequality, but conclude that this correlation is contrary to the expected
finding. This, in tum, forces us to reject the two separate but inter-linked theories on the
growth-inequality relationship stemming from the literature.
First, the findings from this data force us to reject the hypothesis that income
inequality and economic growth are positively correlated through SBTC. This is not to
suggest that SBTC does not playa role in raising the wage dispersion or household
income inequality. However, to the extent that new technology is skill-biased on the
wage or household income structure, it apparently has its effect apart from economic
growth. The association between the measures of technological change and economic
growth found in the first-stage regression in Table 4, combined with the findings on the
second-stage regression presented in Table 6, suggest 1) that SBTC has no impact on
income inequality through economic growth, or 2) that the variables we have chosen to
operationalize these concepts fail to adequately measure the relationship. If it is the
latter, then the variables used to measure technological change in the present study may
be invalid. If, on the other hand, they are valid, the technological change they reflect may
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not be skill-biased (i.e., perhaps patented inventions or changes in labor market
composition reflect technological change that is, on balance, skill-neutral rather than
skill-biased). Further, even if the measures of technological change are both valid and
skill-biased, their impact on economic growth may be so weak as to be unable to
indirectly impact income inequality. At the very least, the findings in Table 4, Model 2,
suggest this. In any case, we simply cannot substantiate the theory that SBTC explains
rising inequality by observing a positive association between economic growth and
income inequality; such an association does not exist as evidenced by the findings
presented here. 44
Second, the theory of an extended or reformulated Kuznets Curve Hypothesis
related to the growth-inequality relationship also cannot be supported by the evidence
presented here, and is thus also weakened. To the extent that a growth-inequality
relationship exists, the data used here support the original Kuznets Hypothesis that rising
economic growth leads to a reduction in income inequality, controlling for other factors,
as suggested by the negative sign on the real per capita GMP coefficient in Table 6. The
measures used in the present research fail to find any evidence of a Kuznets Curve
indicating a V-shaped or positive association between growth and inequality during
periods of economic structural shifts or post-industrial (skill-biased) technological

In fact, the implications for the SBTC theory of rising income inequality go beyond the fmdings
summarized in Table 6. The design of the present research study was to detect the indirect effect, if any, of
skill-biased technological change on rising income inequality through changes in economic growth. In the
method employed here, support for this theory cannot be established. In addition, in results summarized in
Appendix A, Table 7, a standard OLS multivariate regression testing the direct effect between the two
measures of technological change and income inequality reveals no association between these two
measures of technological change and changes in income inequality. When controlling for the effect of
decennial changes in real per capita GMP, neither the growth rate in per capita patent approvals nor the
change in skilled and technical occupational composition register a significant association with changes in
household inequality. These fmdings further weaken support for the SBTC explanation for rising
44
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change. Apparently, economic growth reduces household inequality not only during the
middle and later stages of industrialization, say, during the 1940s and 1950s in the United
States, but continues to put downward pressure on household inequality even when a
mature industrial economy begins a structural shift toward a post-industrial economic
base. This finding bolsters support for the original Kuznets Curve theory and forces us to
caution theoretical and empirical research arguing against it. What is surprising is the
fact that this relationship prevails even in an advanced economy like the United States, at
least at the metropolitan area level. While Galbraith and Kum (2002) find general
confirmation of the original Kuznets process, even they suggest that the growthinequality relationship may reverse itself in the richest countries, with a turning point at
some high level of income or per capita growth. The findings presented here appear to
indicate otherwise (or at least suggest that U.S. metropolitan economies have not reached
this turning point yet), although the relatively weak association between growth and
inequality force us to interpret these findings with caution.
Most ofthe previous growth-inequality research uses cross-sectional data at a
point-in-time to test the relationship between the level of real median household income
(an alternative measure of economic growth) and the level of household income
inequality. This is slightly different from the present study using cross-sectional data
over a period-of-time (1990 to 2000) to test the relationship between changes in
household income inequality and changes in real per capita GMP. Nonetheless, the
findings are similar, indicating that real per capita economic growth explains variations in
household income inequality, and, at least in metropolitan areas during the 1990s, this

inequality, with the caveat that we assume these two measures of technological change are valid and skillbiased rather than skill-neutral.
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association is negative. The most apparent explanation for this negative association is
that rising real per capita output may reflect increases in real income for the households
that make up the lowest end of the income distribution. As the lowest household incomes
rise, and provided they rise more rapidly than households in the upper end of the
distribution and/or comprise a larger proportion ofthe distribution, the overall household
income distribution becomes less dispersed and thus less unequal. This is a somewhat
counterintuitive finding given the fact that overall inequality during the 1990s appears to
have increased, as indicated by the Gini coefficient comparisons in Table 3. However,
the independent effect of real per capita economic growth may restrain the rise in
household income inequality even as other factors work to increase it This conclusion is
much more plausible when we consider the low R2 on Model 4 in Table 6. The variables
in this model, including the rate of economic growth, explain less than 13 percent of the
variation in household income inequality. Clearly, economic growth may mildly reduce
the rise in inequality while some other omitted variable(s) has (have) a much larger
counteracting effect.
Additionally, the coefficient on the MSAlCMSA population growth rate reveals a
significant and negative correlation with the point change in the Gini index of household
income inequality from 1990 to 2000, again confirming Kuznets' (1955) original theory
that advanced-stage urbanization would tend to reduce income inequality (if we permit
metropolitan population growth to approximate the concept of "urbanization"). When
controlling for other factors, Model 4 indicates that a one percentage point increase in
metropolitan population growth from 1990 to 2000 is associated with a .0002 point
decline in the Gini index measure of household inequality, and this correlation is
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statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level (p :S .01). Population growth,
then, appears to (mildly) reduce or suppress changes in household income inequality in
metropolitan areas, at least during the 1990s.
This finding is distinct from previous studies on the metropolitan populationinequality relationship since the genesis of this line of research began during the 1970s.
Most of the previous research exploring the association between urban population and
inequality makes use of metropolitan cross-sectional data on population and inequality
levels, as opposed to population and inequality growth rates as employed in the present
research. In a path analysis model, Betz (1972) finds only an indirect positive
relationship between population levels and levels of household income inequality through
an endogenous industrial diversification variable. Farbman (1975) divides metropolitan
areas into four distinct categorical (ordinal) rankings based upon population level and
also finds a positive relationship between population and household income inequality
levels. Bums (1975) is one of the first studies to test the association between population
growth rates and household income inequality levels. Using cross-sectional census data
from 1950 and 1960, Bums finds no relationship between population growth rates over
this decade and the level of household income inequality in 1960.

Long, Rasmussen

and Hayworth (1977) find a statistically significant positive association between
population levels and household income inequality levels in cross-sectional Census data
in 1970. These same authors repeat this study with a follow-up 1978 paper in which they
find a positive and statistically significant association between the 1960 to 1970
metropolitan population growth rate and 1970 household income inequality levels
(Hayworth, Long & Rasmussen, 1978).
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Subsequent research on the urban population-inequality relationship continues to
confirm the positive association found by most studies between population levels or
population growth rates and the level of household income inequality during the 1960s,
1970s and 1980s (Galster, 1989; Garofalo & Fogarty, 1979; Kennedy & Nord, 1984;
Nelson & Lorence, 1985; Nord, 1980a, 1980b). More recently, using cross-sectional
Census data from 1980 and 1990, Chakravorty (1996a) finds metropolitan population
levels to be positively associated with the level of household income inequality, but finds
population growth rates from 1980 to 1990 to be negatively correlated with the level of
household income inequality in 1990. When contrasted with the research by Hayworth,
Long and Rasmussen (1978) for 1960 and 1970 data, Chakravorty's finding suggests a
change in the way in which population growth rates impact household income inequality
levels from the 1960s to the 1980s. Finally, Cloutier (1997) uses cross-sectional Census
data from 1980 and 1990 to test the association between population levels and decennial
population growth rates on household income inequality in 1990. He finds no significant
effect of population level and decennial population growth rates on household income
inequality levels in 1990.
This leaves only the present study, then, to test for the unique relationship
between decennial population growth rates and changes in household income inequality
from 1990 to 2000. The negative and significant association found between these two
variables in Model 4 provides a preliminary basis for future research in this area. One
possible extension in this line of research would be to control for the effects of population
levels in the regression model to determine if population growth remains significantly
correlated with changes in household inequality. Additionally, the use of an interaction
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term between metropolitan population growth rate and population level may provide
further evidence on the effect of metropolitan population growth conditional on
population levels.
Two final predictors of changes in metropolitan household income inequality are
consistent with expectations in Model 4. Holding other factors constant, the measure on
educational inequality is positively associated with changes in household income
inequality, as we would expect, and is statistically significant at the 99 percent
confidence level (p < .01). For each one percentage point increase in the proportion of
the metropolitan population with educational achievement below a high-school diploma
and above a bachelor's degree, the change in the Gini index measuring household income
inequality rises by .0014 points. As the disparity in education levels rises, household
income disparity also rises.
This is not an unexpected finding, and much prior research has suggested that
educational inequality wi11lead to wage and income inequality (Glomm & Ravikumar,
1992; Levy, 1995; Lynch, 1995). Conversely, greater equality of educational opportunity
and education levels will tend to lead to greater equality of wages and incomes over the
long run (Goldin & Katz, 2001; Goldin & Margo, 1992; Margo, 1999). If education and
income levels are positively associated, as is widely understood (Bound & Johnson,
1992; Levy, 1995; Levy & Murnane, 1992; Murphy & Welch, 1993), then a rise in the
proportion of the population in the extreme tails of the educational distribution (those
with graduate or professional degrees plus those with less than a high school diploma)
should be expected to lead to an increase in income disparity measured by the household
Gini coefficient.
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Finally, changes in the racial dissimilarity index measuring racial housing
segregation are also positively and significantly correlated with changes in household
income inequality in metropolitan economies, as expected. Although this association is
relatively weak, metropolitan areas with increases in racial housing segregation also tend
to experience rising household income inequality. This supports the hypothesis that
changes in housing segregation along racial lines (which is often a proxy for income
segregation as well) may playa minor role in explaining changes in metropolitan
household income inequality, controlling for other factors.
This finding lends tentative support to the literature on the spatial mismatch
hypothesis (Chakravorty, 1996b; Hill & Wolman, 1997a; Hill & Wolman, 1997b: Holzer,
1987; Holzer & Ihlanfeldt, 1996; Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, 1990; Kain, 1968; Massey &
Denton, 1987; Massey & Eggers, 1993; Mayer, 1996; O'Regan & Quigley, 1996; Taylor
& Ong, 1995; Wilson, 1987). Spatial housing segregation between blacks and nonblacks

may isolate blacks in urban areas that lack access to information about job opportunities
or employment that would match their skill levels. If so, it would explain why blacks, as
a group, have lower incomes than nonblacks, in tum exacerbating overall household
income inequality in metropolitan areas. Nonblack households with rising incomes may
locate in the suburbs in closer proximity to employment opportunities that match their
education level and/or skill set. Additionally, nonblack households may have greater
access to private transportation in the form of automobiles than black households (Taylor
and Ong), permitting them greater mobility in finding and traveling to and from jobs.
Black households, on the other hand, may have lower incomes and lack the means to
relocate closer to jobs that fit their education levels or skill sets. This may isolate black
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households in inner-city neighborhoods where they lack infonnation about job
opportunities and also private transportation (an automobile) that could get them this
access. In theory, then, spatial mismatch may lead to a combination of rising nonblack
household income with falling or stagnant black household income that could, in tum,
widen income disparities and lead to a larger rise in income inequality (Mayer). Based
upon the findings in Table 6 revealing a positive association between changes in the
dissimilarity index and changes in the Gini coefficient, it seems reasonable to conclude
that spatial segregation between black and nonblack households (spatial mismatch) plays
some limited role in explaining rising household income inequality in metropolitan areas
from 1990 to 2000, all else constant.

45

None of the other predictors in Model 4 were found to be significantly associated
with changes in the Gini index of household income inequality from 1990 to 2000. The
percentage change in per capita real transfer payments from 1990 to 2000 was found to
be unrelated to changes in household inequality over this period. And, changes in the
additional demographic, household structure, and regional control variables were also
found to be uncorrelated with changes in household income inequality over this period.
Overall, Model 4 is statistically significant. However, as mentioned above, the
model exhibits weak explanatory power with a relatively low R2 coefficient of
detennination. The variables included in this model explain only 10 to 13 percent of the
variation in the decennial change in the Gini index of household income inequality,
leaving much ofthe change in household income inequality from 1990 to 2000 largely
unexplained. We can only conclude that some other variable or variables excluded from

Some research indicates a reinforcing effect of both educational inequality and spatial mismatch on
income inequality. Spatial mismatch may reinforce educational inequality, which in tum leads to greater

45
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the present study is (are) responsible for the changes in metropolitan household income
inequality over this period, providing fertile ground for future research.

wage and income inequality. For a further exploration of this theory, see Kain & Singleton, 1996.
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CHAPTER V

Summary and Conclusions
Summary of Findings

One of the initial noteworthy findings in the present research is that technological
change defined as the percentage rate of growth in metropolitan per capita utility patent
approvals from 1990 to 1999 has only a weak positive association to metropolitan
economic growth, operationalized as the rate of increase in per capita real GMP from
1990 to 2000. Patent data, therefore, may be a poor indicator of the effects of
technological change on economic growth, at least at the metropolitan area scale. This is
an important finding in the present research related to the use of patent data as a predictor
of growth. This relatively weak association may result for several reasons.
First, while utility patent approvals may be a good indicator of inventiveness or
entrepreneurship in urban areas (Higgs, 1971), or may give good indications of
metropolitan technological spillovers in close geographic proximity (Carlino, 2001;
Higgs; Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993), they may simply be a poor predictor of
economic growth. As a measure of technological change, utility patent data apparently
do not correlate well with real per capita output in metropolitan areas. This does not
imply that the findings presented here are in contradiction to the uses of patent data as
measures of inventiveness or technological spillovers in the previous research cited
above. Patent data may measure variations in these concepts quite well, yet fail to
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perform well as a predictor of economic growth. Not all inventive activities necessarily
create economic growth.
Second, utility patents approved at a given geographic location may not have any
growth-inducing impact at that location. This is consistent with one of the major
critiques, by Griliches (1990), of the use of patent data. The growth impacts of the
inventions linked to utility patent approvals, if there are any, might be felt at different
geographic locations. The metropolitan area to which the utility patent approval is
assigned may not benefit economically from the invention to which the patent is linked,
particularly if the patented invention is more productive or useful in an industry that is
unrelated to the industry to which the original patent was granted. Further, the industry
that created the patented invention may not be the industry that uses the patented
invention. If so, then the patented invention may generate no observable economic
benefits for the geographic location to which the utility patent was originally granted or
assigned. In other words, there may be a disconnect between the industry and location
where the patent was originally granted and the industry and location where the patented
invention is actually used, making it difficult to trace the economic benefits from
patented inventions using only geographically-based utility patent approval rates.
Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) attempt to trace the effects of patents
geographically to understand how patent approvals in one period and in one location
effect patent approvals in a later period at that same location. These authors find that
later patents tend to emanate from geographic locations that are in close proximity to the
previous patents they cite (or to which they are linked in terms of their inventive
genealogy), suggesting self-reinforcing inventiveness due to localized technological
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spillovers. However, this says nothing about the impact of successive patents on the level
or rate of growth in economic output at those geographic locations. One can easily
hypothesize two distinct metropolitan economies in different locations. One economy
engages in large amounts of R&D and generates many new patented inventions.
Perhaps a research university is located within its boundaries or it is characterized as an
incubator economy or "nursery city" (Duranton & Puga, 2001). The other metropolitan
area simply imports the inventions and ideas generated by the first, putting them to use
increasing productivity and the output of goods and services. Indeed, Duranton and Puga
argue that many cities can be characterized by one ofthe two alternatives suggested in
this scenario, depending upon the product life cycle stage. Tn this scenario, it is
reasonable to assume that measures of economic growth such as the growth rate in real
per capita GMP would register stronger output growth in the second economy than in the
first. Perhaps it is for this reason that the findings in Table 4 do not reveal a strong
relationship between patent approval rates and the rate of per capita economic growth in
metropolitan economies over the 1990s.
Finally, as Griliches (1990) also points out, there is much inventive activity that is
not patented due to concerns over trade secrecy and innovation concealment between
rivals. Perhaps inventive activity that is not patented (and thus concealed) has a much
greater impact on economic output in a given geographic location than do the patented
inventions in these same locations. If so, this would further explain the weak association
between utility patent approvals and per capita economic growth in metropolitan
economies that we find here.
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An equally important finding in the present research is that technological change
defined as the change in the proportion of professional- and technology-sector
occupations per metropolitan area from 1990 to 2000 is positively associated with the
rate of increase in per capita real GMP from 1990 to 2000. The much stronger
association between the occupational measure of technological change and per capita
economic growth (as compared to the results on the patent data measure) may result for
several reasons. First, metropolitan labor market composition is itself a function of GMP
given the methodology used in computing GMP. IfGMP is derived from GSP (gross
state product) and assigned back to metropolitan areas based upon the proportion of
metropolitan workers in distinct industrial categories, then changes in GMP should be
logically related to changes in labor market composition. Thus, it is not surprising to find
a correlation.
Second, labor market measures are geographically fixed and thus not separable
from their metropolitan location. Where patented inventions in one area can be easily
drawn into use at another location, labor market occupational change is fixed to the
geographic area by which it is defined. Thus, it should be expected to relate to changes
in economic growth in that metropolitan area.
Another important finding is that population growth rates appear to have been
inversely correlated with real per capita economic growth during the 1990s, all else
constant. Metropolitan economies with higher levels of population growth over this
period experienced slower rates of growth in real per capita output. As mentioned above,
this was not simply a result of metropolitan population levels growing faster than the
level of real GMP. More likely, metropolitan areas with relatively higher rates of
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population growth saw a decline in real per capita economic growth due to some form of
congestion externality. One theory is that metropolitan areas with strong population
growth failed to maintain adequate public goods and infrastructure consistent with this
growth (such as street and highway construction, public utility services, law enforcement,
coordination of urban economic development, etc.), thus restraining the rate of growth in
real per capita GMP. The lack of adequate public goods and infrastructure for a growing
population may playa role in retarding economic growth by reducing productivity
throughout the metropolitan economy. Infrastructure buildup may lag behind population
growth, so that cities with high population growth do not see real economic growth until
some later period when the provision of public goods and services has had a chance to
catch up to population increases.
The most important finding revealed in this paper is the relationship found
between economic growth and changes in the Gini measure of household income
inequality. The design of the present research study was to detect an indirect positive
effect, if any, of SBTC on inequality through changes in economic growth. If
technological change is skill-biased (as much previous research has suggested) and is a
relatively large determinant of economic growth, we should be able to observe a positive
relationship between technology-driven economic growth and income inequality, all else
constant. In the method employed here, support for this theory could not be established.
Additionally, this research study sought to test the theory of an extended or reformulated
Kuznets Curve in which economic growth and income inequality might be positively
correlated due to structural shifts from an industrial economy to a post-industrial
information economy. This theory, too, must be rejected based upon the findings.
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Real per capita GMP growth rates from 1990 to 2000 were found to be inversely
correlated with changes in the Gini measure of metropolitan household income inequality
over this same period. Thus, the measure of economic growth employed in the present
research was found to be significantly related to changes in metropolitan inequality
during the 1990s, but in the opposite direction relative to theoretical expectations. While
economic growth is found to be a function of technological change, as mentioned above,
economic growth reflected in increases in real per capita GMP appears to decrease, not
increase, income inequality over the decade investigated here.
These findings prevent support for or confirmation of the theory that SBTC
exrlilins rising inequality, at least using the measures employed here. This is not to
suggest that we can reject this theory altogether; just that we have failed to confirm it.
There are several possible reasons for these results that bear further explanation.
First, SBTC may have no impact on the income or wage distribution through
economic growth. Its effect may be distinct from, and in fact in direct opposition to, the
effects of economic growth on income inequality. If SBTC does in fact raise income
inequality, as many authors argue, it must do so apart from economic growth as defined
in the present research. Second, the variables used in this study to operationalize and
measure SBTC may be invalid. They may fail to measure the concepts adequately, either
because these measures are invalid measures of technological change generally, or
because, more specifically, the technological change they capture is skill-neutral rather
than skill-biased (i.e., perhaps patented inventions or changes in labor market
composition reflect technological change that is, on balance, skill-neutral rather than
skill-biased). SBTC may impact both economic growth and income inequality, but
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through measures other than those employed here. Thirdly, even if we concede that the
measures of technological change used in this study are valid, they may be so weakly
associated with economic growth that their subsequent impact on income inequality is
undetectable.
To summarize these points: Both of the two measures oftechnological change
employed in the present study are positively and significantly correlated with economic
46

growth (although one of them only weakly so). Additionally, the measure of economic
growth used in this study is negatively and significantly correlated with the change in
metropolitan household income inequality. And, in results not shown here, the two
measures of technological change used in this study are- found to be uncorrelated with
changes in metropolitan household income inequality when controlling for the effects of
changes in real per capita GMP. In other words, the measures of technological change
used in the present study are not found to be correlated with changes in household
income inequality in metropolitan economies in a manner consistent with the SBTC
theory of income inequality. It necessarily follows from this evidence, then, that we must
reject the hypothesis that SBTC leads to rising income inequality through economic
growth. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to argue that the measures of
technological change used in the present research are either invalid, or are skill-neutral
rather than skill-biased.

A repeat of the first-stage regression model (Equation 2, results of which are summarized in Table 4) was
conducted using a secondary measure of economic growth (percentage change in real median household
income 1990-2000) as the alternative dependent variable. In results not shown here, the impact of
technological change on the alternative measure of economic growth was found to be nearly identical to the
results presented in Modell in Table 4. This further confirms the similarities between the two alternative
measures of economic growth employed in this study, and reveals a strong consistency in the relationship
between the chosen measures of technological change and the concept of economic growth generally.
46
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Apart from these arguments, we can only conclude that if the SBTC explanation
for rising inequality is to be supported, it may need to be demonstrated apart from the
effects of economic growth on inequality, and with the use of alternative measures of
technological change other than those employed in the present research. Based upon the
results found here, a proportionate increase in the metropolitan population in
professional-, managerial- and technology-sector occupations raises metropolitan
economic growth, and rising metropolitan economic growth subsequently reduces
metropolitan household income inequality. This is not implausible. As the percentage of
the metropolitan population becomes more professionalized and as the number of jobs in
technical ()ccllpations rises, real output and income should also be expected to rise. At
the same time, household income dispersion should narrow as the workers in
metropolitan populations become more homogeneous and as household income increases.
This is perhaps the most important finding in the present research.
An alternative or reformulated Kuznets Curve Hypothesis also cannot be
supported by the evidence presented here. The measure of economic growth used in this
analysis is negatively correlated with changes in household income inequality, all else
constant. Hence, the original Kuznets Hypothesis is at least partially supported: rising
economic growth in metropolitan areas tends to result in falling metropolitan household
income inequality, all else constant. This is consistent with Kuznets' original growthinequality hypothesis. A reformulated or extended Kuznets Curve Hypothesis, positing a
positive relationship between economic growth and income inequality owing to
technological and structural changes in a post-industrial information economy cannot be
substantiated by the evidence presented here. To the extent that structural and/or
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technological changes raise economic growth, they (apparently) put downward pressure
on household income inequality, at least in u.s. metropolitan economies during the
1990s. The quest for a growth-related or technology-related explanation for rising
household income inequality during the 1990s will need to pursue other avenues of
research than those presented here. Card and DiNardo (2002) also question the
explanatory power of the SBTC theory of rising wage and income inequality, pointing
out that wage and income inequality began to stabilize in the 1990s even as technological
change continued to accelerate. One explanation for this may be that technological
change has become less skill-biased and more skill-replacing in recent years, particularly
as personal computers and other technological advancements have become more "user
friendly." If so, this would tend to (moderately) reduce the relative demand for skilled
over unskilled labor, restraining the rise in wage and income inequality. This theory has
implications for the measures of technological change used in the present research
because, as mentioned above (and again below), these measures may not reflect skillbiasedness, and may reflect changes in technology over the 1990s that were instead skillneutral or skill-replacing.
A less important yet interesting finding is the negative relationship found between
the population growth rate and the point change in the Gini index of household income
inequality from 1990 to 2000. If the decennial rate of growth in MSNCMSA population
levels is a loose proxy for urbanization, then this finding lends further support to
Kuznets' (1955) original theory that late-stage urbanization in advanced industrial
economies tends to depress income inequality. When controlling for other factors,
population growth appears to (mildly) reduce or suppress changes in household income
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inequality in metropolitan areas, at least during the 1990s. This finding is distinct from
previous studies on the metropolitan population-inequality relationship since this line of
research began during the 1970s. Most of the previous research exploring the association
between urban population and inequality makes use of metropolitan cross-sectional data
on population and inequality levels, as opposed to population and inequality growth rates
as employed in the present study. Further, the findings in prior research suggest that
population levels and/or population growth rates are either uncorrelated or positively
correlated with the level of household income inequality in metropolitan areas.
Only the present study tests for the unique relationship between decennial
population growth rates and changes in household income inequality from] 990 to 2000.
And, the inverse relationship found between population growth and changes in household
income inequality in metropolitan areas contradicts the theory that greater population
growth or higher population levels raise inequality. One implication is that there has
been a change in the association between these two variables during the 1990s.
The negative and significant association found between these two variables
provides a preliminary basis for future research in this area. One possible extension in
this line of research would be to control for the effects of population levels in the
regression model to determine if population growth remains significantly correlated with
changes in household inequality. Additionally, the use of an interaction term between
metropolitan population growth rate and population level may provide further evidence
on the effect of metropolitan population growth conditional on population levels. In any
case, the negative association between metropolitan population growth and household
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income inequality lends further support to Kuznets' (1955) original hypothesis that
urbanization in advanced economies would tend to depress inequality.
Two other predictors of changes in metropolitan household income inequality are
also important findings in the present research. Holding other factors constant, the
measure on educational inequality is positively associated with changes in household
income inequality, as we would expect. As the disparity in education levels rises,
household income disparity also rises.
This is not an unexpected finding, and much prior research has suggested that
educational inequality will lead to wage and income inequality (Glomm & Ravikumar,
1992; Levy, 1995; Lynch, 1995). Conversely, greater equality of educational opportunity
and education levels will tend to lead to greater equality of wages and incomes over the
long run (Goldin & Katz, 2001; Goldin & Margo, 1992; Margo, 1999). If education and
income levels are positively associated, as is widely understood (Bound & Johnson,
1992; Levy, 1995; Levy & Murnane, 1992; Murphy & Welch, 1993), then a rise in the
proportion of the population in the extreme tails of the educational distribution (those
with graduate or professional degrees plus those with less than a high school diploma)
should be expected to lead to an increase in income disparity measured by the household
Gini coefficient.
Finally, changes in the racial dissimilarity index measuring racial housing
segregation are also positively and significantly correlated with changes in household
income inequality in metropolitan economies, as expected. Although this association is
weak and barely achieves significance, metropolitan areas with increases in racial
housing segregation also tend to experience rising household income inequality. This
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supports the hypothesis that changes in housing segregation along racial lines (which is
often a proxy for income segregation as well) may playa minor role in explaining
changes in metropolitan household income inequality, controlling for other factors.
This finding lends support to the literature on the spatial mismatch hypothesis
(Chakravorty, 1996b; Hill & Wolman, 1997a; Hill & Wolman, 1997b; Holzer, 1987;
Holzer & lhlanfeldt, 1996; Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, 1990; Kain, 1968; Massey & Denton,
1987; Massey & Eggers, 1993; Mayer, 1996; O'Regan & Quigley, 1996; Taylor & Ong,
1995; Wilson, 1987). Spatial housing segregation between blacks and nonblacks may
isolate blacks in urban areas that lack access to information about job opportunities or
employment that would match their skill levels. If so, then hlRcks would tend to have
lower incomes than nonblacks, exacerbating overall household income inequality in
metropolitan areas. Nonblack households with rising incomes may locate in the suburbs
in closer proximity to employment opportunities that match their education level and/or
skill set. Additionally, nonblack households may have greater access to private
transportation in the form of automobiles than black households (Taylor and Ong),
permitting them greater mobility in finding and traveling to and from jobs. Black
households, on the other hand, may have lower incomes and lack the means to relocate
closer to jobs that fit their education levels or skill sets. This may isolate black
households in inner-city neighborhoods where they lack information about job
opportunities and also private transportation (an automobile) that could get them this
access. In theory, then, spatial mismatch may lead to a combination of rising white
household income with falling or stagnant black household income that could, in tum,
widen income disparities and lead to a larger rise in income inequality. Based upon the
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findings in Table 6 revealing a positive association between changes in the dissimilarity
index and changes in the Gini coefficient, it seems reasonable to conclude that spatial
segregation between black and nonblack households (spatial mismatch) plays some
limited role in explaining rising household income inequality in metropolitan areas from
1990 to 2000, all else constant.

Policy Recommendations

Although these findings do not offer any apparent detailed policy
recommendations, and do not necessarily lead us to policy goals that have not been
identified before, for those interested in reducing or restraining the rise in income
inequality, the findings presented here provide some general direction. It seems clear
that, to varying degrees, at least three primary factors explain the changes in household
income inequality in metropolitan areas during the 1990s: the growth rate in real per
capita GMP, changes in the distribution of educational achievement, and changes in
black-nonblack housing segregation.
It should be noted that the policy recommendations offered here are not

anticipated to have immediate impacts, but might have some minor impact over the long
run. Hence, because they address long-run changes, they are also more speculative.
Additionally, these policy proposals may not serve to reduce income inequality in every
setting or under all circumstances, and may lead to consequences not foreseen
beforehand. We should be very clear in admitting the possibility of such outcomes from
the start, and remain humble and modest in our efforts.
First, it seems clear from the present findings that to reduce or restrain household
income inequality, efforts could be taken to raise real per capita GMP. Real per capita
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growth (apparently) lifts the household income shares of the households in the bottom
quintiles ofthe income distribution, reducing metropolitan household income inequality.
This appears to be the effect over the 1990s as evidenced in this study. As the lowest
household incomes rise, and provided they rise more rapidly than households in the upper
end of the distribution and/or comprise a larger proportion of the distribution, the overall
household income distribution becomes less dispersed and thus less unequal. Again, this
is a somewhat counterintuitive finding given the fact that overall inequality during the
1990s appears to have increased, as indicated by the Gini coefficient comparisons in
Table 3. However, the independent effect of real per capita economic growth may

restnlin the rise in household income inequality even as other factors work to increase it.
This conclusion is much more plausible when we consider the low R2 on Model 4 in
Table 6. The variables in this model, including the rate of economic growth, explain less

than 13 percent of the variation in household income inequality. Clearly, economic
growth may mildly reduce the rise in inequality while some other omitted variable(s) has
(have) a much larger counteracting effect.
Policies geared toward income redistribution through direct transfer payments and
social programs would apparently do little to achieve greater equality in household
incomes based upon the findings in the present research. The growth rate in real per
capita transfer payments from 1990 to 2000 was not found to have any impact on the
point change in the Gini coefficient of household income inequality over this period,
controlling for other factors. 47 Using additional transfer payments to decrease income

It should be noted that the Gini measure of income inequality is less sensitive to changes in the income
distribution occurring in the extreme tails of the distribution (Ryscavage, 1999, p. 34). This may explain
the absence of a statistically significant finding between the change in transfer payments and changes in the
Gini index of household income inequality.

47

118

inequality would appear to be a fruitless strategy. The sign on the transfer payment
coefficient in Table 6 is in the expected negative direction, suggesting that an increase in
per capita transfer payments does tend to reduce household income inequality. However,
when controlling for other factors, the effect is not statistically significant. 48
Better approaches to spurring per capita economic growth, based upon recent
research as well as the findings presented in this study, may be to pursue local economic
development initiatives that encourage entrepreneurship and innovation (Feldman &
Francis, 2004), attract firms in the science and technology (S&T) industry that would, in
tum, raise the proportion of knowledge workers (Plosila, 2004), increase the proportion
of skilled or "creative" labor in technology- and professional-sector empbyment
(Florida, 2004), raise human capital levels through education (Gottlieb & Fogarty, 2003),
and provide labor market training or re-training opportunities for laborers from lowincome households (Blakely & Bradshaw, 2002; Fitzgerald and Leigh, 2002; Lynch,
1995). It seems clear from the results of the first-stage regression summarized in Table 4
that improvements in the overall skill level, technological orientation and
professionalization of the metropolitan population in tum improve the prospects for real
per capita economic output. Educational attainment also modestly improves per capita
economic growth. Thus, investments in education and training geared toward increasing
the proportion of the metropolitan population employed in professional- and
technological-sector occupations could have a significant positive impact on per capita
growth, in tum reducing or restraining household income inequality. Additionally,

In a simple bivariate regression and correlation analysis, the percentage change in metropolitan real per
capita transfer payments from 1990 to 2000 was not found to be associated with the growth rate in real per
capita GMP over this period. Thus, arguments that transfer payments retard real per capita economic
48
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subsidies to start-up businesses, municipally-financed venture capital lending to
entrepreneurs from low-income households, enterprise/empowerment zones in lowincome areas, or business improvement districts may raise real per capita GMP and
household income in metropolitan areas. Again, these types of policies would apparently
have their greatest impact on reducing or restraining household income inequality if they
are designed to attract or retain businesses that I) employ a relatively higher proportion
of technology workers and/or offer professional and managerial employment
opportunities, and 2) utilize a relatively higher proportion of employees who hold a fouryear degree or more.
Florida (2004) argues that growing cities are marked by an increasing contingent
of professionals who generate new technologies and new ideas through networks of
creativity within an urban economy. He suggests that this "creative class" of workers,
instilled with a high level of diversity, individuality, intelligence, education, drive, and
creativity, are one of the primary forces behind why some urban and regional economies
experience rapid development and economic growth. The results found in the present
study can be interpreted as a (tentative) confirmation of this theory if we accept that the
variable measuring proportionate changes in technical and professional occupations
captures some of this "creative class," which is plausible. Thus, policies geared toward
attracting elements of this skilled and creative population into metropolitan economies
could improve the prospects for economic growth and, in tum, serve to restrain
household income inequality.

growth in metropolitan economies would not be supported by the data used in this study. The equalityefficiency tradeoff first identified by Okun (1975) therefore could not be confirmed.
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One policy proposal at the national level that could increase the levels of skilled
and "creative" labor in (some) metropolitan economies is to lift restrictions on the supply
of high-skilled, high-education immigrant labor into the United States, especially in an
effort to increase the relative levels of scientists, engineers, and other workers in high
demand in S&T sectors (Romer, 2000). By increasing substantially the number of green
cards and visas issued to high-skilled and educated immigrants, and by accelerating
citizenship for these workers, the supply of high-skilled labor in metropolitan economies
could be increased. One implication from the results presented in this paper is that such
an increase would improve the prospects of economic growth and in turn reduce
household income inequality, all else equal. Further) there is an additional theoretical
argument for encouraging high-skilled immigration: an increase in the supply of skilled
labor, ceteris paribus, would tend to create wage and income compression as it has
apparently done throughout history (Goldin & Katz, 1996; Goldin & Margo, 1992;
Margo, 1999).
Lynch (1995) argues that employer-provided training may promote gains in
wages and household income that would mitigate against rising inequality. Training may
playa role in lowering the income gap (or at least preventing it from getting larger) by
increasing the supply of skilled labor, raising labor productivity and per capita economic
growth, in turn creating some relative wage and income compression as the findings of
the present study suggest. However, to raise real per capita growth and simultaneously
reduce income inequality, Lynch is careful to point out that labor training efforts must be
directed at laborers from low-income households rather than benefiting only employees
from middle- and upper-income households as is often the case. Means-tested training
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subsidies or tax credits from local government jurisdictions to local businesses may
encourage employer-provided training geared toward low-income labor, although such
policies have not always generated the intended results (Blakely & Bradshaw, 2002).
Second, and closely related, a reduction in educational inequality would likely
reduce the level or rate of increase in household income inequality based upon the
findings presented here. Policies that increase educational opportunity have historically
been found to result in wage compression by increasing the relative supply of skilled
labor and reducing or restricting income inequality (Goldin & Katz, 2001; Goldin &
Margo, 1992). It seems clear that policies promoting educational equality by raising the
educational attairuncnt oflow··income households serve not only to reduce household
income inequality, but should also promote economic growth through improvements in
human capital and labor productivity as implied by the findings presented here and
elsewhere (Gottlieb & Fogarty, 2003). Levy (1995) makes just such an argument,
claiming that an increase in educational attainment by younger demographic groups (socalled generation X and generation Y cohorts) will increase the supply of skilled labor
and exert downward pressure on the skilled-unskilled income gap. However, he also
predicts that the relative demand for skilled labor will continue to accelerate, leaving
overall income inequality roughly unchanged in spite of the increases in educational
attainment that he forecasts. Bishop (1996) also argues that the demand for skilled labor
(as measured by educational attainment) will not likely abate any time soon. Thus, we
are back to Tinbergen's (1975) characterization of rising income inequality as a simple
race between the demand for and the supply of skilled labor.
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The question, then, becomes how to accelerate the supply of educated (and thus
presumably skilled) labor faster than demand. One method may be to focus on
improving the educational attainment of current adult workers rather than simply waiting
on the skilled wage premium to induce younger generations to increase their educational
attainment. Policies that encourage adult education programs may be the key to
compressing the wage and income gaps without simultaneously harming economic
growth and development. Presumably, the large bulk oflow-skilled workers impacted by
structural economic changes are adults ranging in age from 25 to 45. Thus, education
policies must be designed which will provide incentives and access to higher education
and skill-development specifically designed for the adult, non-traditionalleamer. The
following combination of policy proposals is suggested as a means of accomplishing this
goal.
1) Federal and state personal income tax credits, such as the current federal Lifetime
Learning Credit, might be offered (or the benefits increased) for any adult who returns to
school to complete a degree, or who begins the pursuit of post-secondary education or
vocational training. These tax credits could be designed so that tuition and associated
education costs (provided they are verifiable) can be directly deducted from the
recipient's adjusted gross income. Additionally, adult learners should be eligible to
receive unlimited lifetime income tax credits to provide an incentive for "lifelong
learning" and advancement through education or vocational training year after year as
market forces demand continuous skill improvements.
2) Federal and state corporate income tax credits could be offered for any firm that
hires and employs workers enrolled in higher education or vocational training. Firms of
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any size could receive tax reductions equivalent to a given percentage of their payroll
allocated to the wages and salaries of employees enrolled in post-secondary education or
vocational training. The intent would be to provide firms with the incentive to hire and
retain those employees who are pursuing educational or training/vocational opportunities.
This may also further the demand not just for workers who have already completed a
degree, but also for workers who are willing to pursue a degree.
3) Federal and state grants might be provided directly to both state universities and
private colleges and universities that submit proposals to the Department of Education for
the creation of adult-centered education programs that are designed to provide access to
working'1dult <;tudents. At a minimum, this would entail the provision ·f coursework
I ..

and curriculum designed for adult learners who bring workplace experience into the
classroom, and would allow the adult to earn a traditional baccalaureate or advanced
degree while also working full-time or part-time. The intent would be to provide
institutions of higher learning with incentives to remove the traditional barriers to
education (time and location) for working adults with families and occupational
responsibilities. Prototypes of such adult education programs typically involve evening
classes one or two nights per week structured in an accelerated (non-semester-based)
format, or on-line educational delivery through the Internet. 49
4) Unemployment benefits could be tied directly to the educational pursuits ofthe
recipient as opposed to a percentage of the wages earned on the most recent job. 50 The

The academic integrity and quality of these types of programs may be viewed with some justifiable
skepticism. However, as technology permits a wider distribution of knowledge and information in
alternative delivery formats, the proliferation of these types of education alternatives seems inevitable. It
can only be hoped that competitive pressures, in combination with accreditation standards, will ensure a
modicum of academic quality.
50 The basic concept would be to allow unemployment benefits to be paid according to a fixed proportion of
the costs for the level and type of education being pursued by the recipient (vocational training vs.
49
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intent would be for structurally unemployed individuals to seek higher education and/or
vocational training programs in order to receive unemployment benefits. Rather than
provide proof of having sought employment as a condition for receiving unemployment
benefits, the recipient would be required to provide proof of enrollment (or intent to
enroll) in a program of higher education or vocational training within a specified time
limit. 51
The combination of these education policies could lead to a more rapid and more
fluid transition oflabor from low-skilled and low-wage positions to more highly
demanded and higher paying occupations, thus potentially reducing the level of
household income inequality in metropolitan areas. The novel approach offered here, in
comparison to other policies focusing on education, is that these policies would be
designed to increase the educational attainment of the current adult working population,
not just the educational attainment of future generations passing through the chanrtels of
traditional educational institutions. Although the effects of such policies are merely
speculative, they may serve to accelerate the supply of skilled labor faster than the
demand, thus reducing or at least restraining income inequality over the long run.
Finally, the findings presented here suggest that policies reducing black-nonblack
housing segregation in metropolitan areas may also mitigate the rise in household income
inequality, although most such policies would have only limited effects given the weak
association found in the data. The vast research on spatial mismatch suggests numerous

associates and baccalaureate degrees vs. advanced degrees). Such a policy is ripe for abuse by the recipient
who mayor may not have any interest in human capital development, so proper guidelines would need to
be clearly established and enforced.
51 Current time limitations on the receipt of unemployment insurance could remain in force, or could be
adjusted according to the length of anticipated enrollment in a program of education. However, because of
the proven disincentive effects of prolonged unemployment benefits on job search efforts under current law
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policies that might lead to reduced housing segregation along racial lines, and those
policy recommendations need not be recounted in detail here (Holzer, 1987; Massey &
Denton, 1987; Mayer, 1996; Taylor & Ong, 1995; Wilson, 1987). Additionally, the
previous policies suggested above that focus on raising real per capita GMP and
improving the distribution of education could be equally employed to improve residential
assimilation, given that racial segregation is often a proxy for income segregation (Kain
& Singleton, 1996; Massey & Eggers, 1993; Taylor & Ong, 1995).
Given the weak association found between changes in household income inequality
and changes in black-nonblack housing segregation over the 1990s, suggesting additional
spatial·mismatch-remedying policies beyond those already widely prom')t~rl would be
redundant. As Glaesar and Vigdor (2001) find, the 1990s witnessed a continued decline
in black-nonblack segregation levels, and segregation as measured by the dissimilarity
index appears to be at its lowest level since the 1920s. The median MSAICMSA saw a
drop of .052 points in the dissimilarity index from 1990 to 2000, as reflected in Table 3.
The median dissimilarity index per MSAlCMSA dropped from .5580 in 1990 to .4930 in
2000, a median drop of 11.6 percent over the decade. Over the past 30 years, time and
cultural change reflected in increasing racial tolerance may explain the decline in blacknonblack metropolitan residential segregation as much as any policy intervention. And,
while we cannot ignore the residue of racial intolerance that still remains, there is no
obvious reason to expect the trend toward increased racial harmony to deviate. Thus, we
can tentatively expect that as cultural changes continue to increase tolerance and improve

(Connerly, 2003a, 2003b; Gritz & MaCurdy, 1997; Meyer, 1990), this alternative would require the
recipient to be active in preparing for re-entry into the labor force rather than consuming leisure.
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black-nonblack residential assimilation, these changes will serve to modestly restrain the
rise in metropolitan household income inequality.

Weaknesses and Suggestions for Future Research
Given the methodology, research design and statistical technique used in this
study, there are relatively few threats to validity. The use of secondary unobtrusive
cross-sectional MSA data employed in a two-stage least-squares multiple regression
analysis eliminates many of the typical threats to validity. 52 And, because all but sixteen
MSAs or CMSAs were included in the analysis, and because the omitted cases appeared
to be randomly distributed, the problem of selection bias should be minimized. However,
the weaknesses that do exist are signiticant and deserve careful consideration so that
future research on this subject might be improved.
First, the findings presented here cannot be generalized beyond metropolitan areas
in the u.s. economy during the 1990s. The generalizability of the results is limited
because those results reveal trends and patterns only in large cities (population 50,000
and above) in the United States over a specific ten-year period. While these results might
provide some hint of the linkages between technological change, economic growth and
inequality in other similar-sized cities in similarly developed economies, we cannot use
the findings here presented to make specific predictions about or policy recommendations
for those cities. Further, these findings say nothing about the connections between
technological change, economic growth and household inequality for smaller cities in the
U.S. with populations below 50,000 people. The limited generalizability ofthe findings

52 For a summary of the potential threats to external and internal validity that plague certain types of
research or natural field experiments (such as history, maturation, selection bias, instrumentation, testing,
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thus presents opportunities for further research in at least two alternative directions: 1)
similar metropolitan areas in other developed economies and 2) the consideration of
smaller non-MSA cities in the U.S.
Second, as mentioned earlier in the paper, the validity of the economic growth
variable employed in this research may be somewhat questionable due to the
methodology used in its calculation. Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP) is computed as
a derivative of Gross State Product (GSP) data provided by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. For each state, GSP is allocated by industry to the counties and metropolitan
areas within that state. This allocation is done based upon the relative concentrations of
these industries in the metropolitan areas as measured by employment and labor market
concentrations in these industries and within each county. The distribution of GSP to
each county is based upon the employment weighting of each industry in that county
according to the first two digits in the SIC occupational categories. Thus, the relative
labor concentration of employment in a given industry and county determines the amount
of GSP that is appropriated back to each county and/or MSNCMSA. This approach,
while perhaps offering the most plausible estimate of metropolitan per capita output, is
not exact and is subject to error. It may not accurately reflect the true amount of output
generated by metropolitan economies if the county or metropolitan employment
weighting of the GSP number is inaccurate or biased, thereby inflating or deflating the
level of economic output for the geographic area. Although it is beyond the scope of this
research to suggest specific alternatives, a more improved measure of metropolitan
economic growth may be some type of direct measurement of metropolitan production-

time order, imitation, mortality, compensation, competition and demoralization), see Campbell and Stanley,
1966, and Cook and Campbell, 1979.
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and service-sector output rather than the indirect method used by the BEA and Global
Insight, Inc.
Third, as mentioned throughout, the validity ofthe two measures of technological
change used in this research may be of some concern. While there is no obvious reason
to believe that these measures do not reflect at least some technological innovations for
metropolitan economies, we have not tested these measures to see if they are skill-biased,
skill-neutral, or skill-replacing. The assumption in this paper, supported by previous
literature, has been that the technological measures used are skill-biased. However, at
this point, there is no research to test or confirm this assumption, leaving us to conjecture.
Thus, one of the vulnerabilities of the present research is that the measures of
technological change used, while distinct from those offered in previous studies, may not
accurately reflect the concept of skill-biasedness found in the literature on inequality and
SBTC. Further, we have found at least one ofthese measures of technological change to
be a weak predictor of real per capita economic growth, and neither measure is directly
related to changes in household income inequality over the time period investigated.
While the variable measuring the change in the proportion of the metropolitan
population in professional-, managerial- and technology-sector occupations per
metropolitan area can plausibly be considered a proxy for change in the skill composition
of the labor force, it is not clear whether this change in skill composition is related to
technological change or some other factor. An improvement for future research may be
to employ a specific variable of technological change that has been found to be explicitly
skill-biased in its effect, then to trace its impact on growth and household inequality.
Krueger (1993) finds that the percentage increase in personal computer usage in the labor
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force is a skill-biased measure of technological change, and it would be interesting to see
ifthis variable has any relationship to economic growth andlor household inequality in
metropolitan economies. However, data on this variable was not found for the specific
metropolitan areas used in this study or for the time period investigated for the present
research. Locating data of this or similar nature that has been found to be specifically
skill-biased, and then pairing it with the units of analysis in the present study provides
opportunities for future research and improved findings on the question of technological
change, growth and inequality.
Fourth, the household income Gini may not be the best measure of income
inequality to test for the effects ofSBTC or economic growth on the income distribution.
The variation in the household gross income Gini coefficient from 1990 to 2000 is
relati vel y small, and the mean point increase per MSA was just .0138 (see Table 3).
Additionally, because this variable is based upon a measure of gross pre-tax and pretransfer income, consumption inequality is less than income inequality. And, as
discussed above, household size has declined somewhat between 1990 and 2000, and it is
likely that household composition has changed as well (i.e., the average age of
households, the average proportion of working members of households, etc.). 53 Given
these realities, a plausible argument can be made that underlying income inequality at the
individual level may not have changed all that much during the 1990s, or that, at the very
least, it did not rise as rapidly as it did during the 1980s, a conclusion reached by much of
the research cited in this study. In any case, the household gross income Gini simply
cannot reveal these underlying compositional changes occurring within households from
1990 to 2000.
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As an alternative, Gini coefficients derived from individual earnings data (salary
and wages), as opposed to household income data, would arguably be an improved gauge
of the overall change in income inequality, and may be a more sensitive measure of the
effects of both technological change and economic growth on income dispersion.
Findings from individual earnings inequality, as opposed to household income inequality,
may permit more substantive conclusions on the linkages between technological change,
economic growth, and the wage distribution. If SBTC is a force that tends to widen the
wage and earnings distribution, we would expect to be able to observe this widening
more clearly at the level of individual wages and earnings than at the level of household
income Jf

~'()

a more precise measure of inequality, such as the change in an individual

earnings Gini coefficient, would be an improvement over the change in the household
income Gini and could arguably reflect a greater increase in inequality over the decade in
question. Because individual-level long-form Census data are not publicly available for
Census years 1990 and 2000, and because the household income Gini (as opposed to the
individual earnings Gini) is the more widely used measure of inequality in the research
literature, data on individual earnings inequality was not used. 54
Furthermore, there are alternative measures of inequality other than the Gini
coefficient which, ifused, may also yield different results (Galbraith & Kum, 2002;
Kaplow, 2002; Ryscavage, 1999). To repeat, the household income Gini index was used
because it is the most common measure and thus enables the closest comparison to the

Credit for these critiques and helpful insights goes to Paul Coomes who read an earlier draft of this paper,
For individual level earnings data, the PUMS (Public Use Micro Sample) data set from the Census
Bureau might be used, But, what is gained in terms of individual level data in the PUMS is lost in terms of
the number of cases, sample size, and the precise metropolitan geographic definitions available for MSAs.
The equivalent unit of analysis in the PUMS data would be a PUMA (Public Use Metropolitan Area),
However, PUMAs lack the precise definition of a metropolitan economy because they are geographically
53

54
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majority of previous research on the question of inequality. However, other measures,
such as the 9011 0 ratio, 80/20 ratio, Atkinson and Thiel indexes may be more sensitive to
changes in inequality at the extremes of the income distribution (Ryscavage, 1999) and
thus could be more sensitive to changes in any of the predictor variables used in this
study.
Of course, one final critique of any cross-sectional measure of income inequality
is that it is necessarily static and does not capture income mobility effects over time and
between generations. This criticism applies equally to the present study. Households
that comprise the lowest two quintiles of the income distribution in 1990 may no longer
be found in these quintile~ hy 2000, having risen to higher quintiles. Likewise,
households in the upper quintile in 1990 may have fallen into the middle or lower
quintiles by 2000. Thus, if income mobility is high, in the sense that many households
change position in the income distribution over time, then cross-sectional measures of
household income inequality may be misleading because they give us only a snapshot of
the income distribution without revealing how and why changes in the makeup of this
distribution might occur. On the other hand, recent studies attempting to measure the
degree of income mobility suggest that income mobility over time and across
generations, at least in the United States, is not that large, and may be relatively stable
(Erikson & Goldthorpe, 2002; Solon, 2002).
Fifth, it is highly probable that the effects of many ofthe predictor variables used
in the present study operate with a lag. Increases in the rate of patented technologies or
skilled labor occupations may not have a simultaneous effect on economic growth as

defined by counties which, in some cases, include large non-metropolitan (rural) areas and households
outside MSAs or CMSAs proper.
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assumed in the present research, but may instead operate with a delay. For example, the
rate of growth in utility patents or skilled labor during one decade may not impact
metropolitan per capita output until a subsequent decade. Likewise, the impact of
changes in real per capita economic growth may not coincide strongly with changes in
income inequality during the same period, and the effects may be more pronounced in
some lagged period. Because the present study does not test for the lagged effects of
changes in such measures, and because this study analyzes only simultaneous changes
over a single decade, a potential improvement in future studies may be to test for the
lagged effects, if any, of technological change on economic growth, and of economic
growth on changes in income inequality.
Sixth, one of the most important theoretical explanations offered for rising income
inequality (second only to the SBTC hypothesis) has been the effects of increased
international trade and immigration, products of increased trade openness and the forces
of globalization (Aghion & Williamson, 1998; Borjas, 1995; Borjas & Ramey, 1994;
Freeman, 1995; Harrigan, 1997, 1998; Irwin, 2002; Johnson & Stafford, 1993; Lawrence,
1995; Leamer, 1996; Revenga, 1992; Richardson, 1995; Wood, 1995). Due to the
limitations of metropolitan-level data on international trade in the 1990 and 2000 census
files, the present study was unable to control for the effects of international trade on
metropolitan household income inequality. A potential variable that may be able to
control for this effect would be the percentage of real GMP comprised of net exports
from local metropolitan economies to foreign economies outside the U.S. Some measure
oflocal net exports might serve as a proxy for the effects of international trade on income
or earnings inequality, permitting us to control for these effects in future research.
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Additionally, a measure of the impact of metropolitan immigration on
metropolitan household income inequality was prevented due to limitations in the census
data. It might have been helpful to control for the effects of changes in metropolitan
immigration, and in particular Hispanic immigration, on changes in metropolitan
household income inequality over the 1990s, especially since this has been another
widely accepted explanation for the rise in inequality (and the plateau in median
household income) in recent decades (Brookings Institution, 2001). However, while the
2000 Census data permit a highly refined classification of metropolitan population in
terms of both racial and ethnic categories, the 1990 Census data are much less
parsimonious, offering only broad categories of race. Because the present study was
designed to measure changes in numerous variables over the entire decade, and because
the 1990 and 2000 Census race and ethnicity data are dissimilar, controlling for the
effects of metropolitan Hispanic immigration was not possible using the present data sets
and methodology. Future research may be able to make use of a lesser number of cases
(PUMAs) found in the PUMS data sets to control for the effects of immigration.
Finally, as the results in Table 6 clearly indicate, most of the variation in
metropolitan household income inequality as measured by the household Gini coefficient
remains unexplained. The low R2 in Model 4 suggests that the present study leaves
largely unidentified important factors that could potentially explain changes in income
inequality in metropolitan economies. Some of this residual effect might be accounted
for by the additional variables proposed above for future research in this section, while
other variables remain as yet unidentified. Where possible, it would certainly be
important to control for other factors widely believed to have had some role in raising

134

income inequality in recent decades, particularly the effects of international trade,
immigration, and the decline in the role of labor market institutions such as unions and
the real value of the minimum wage.
Overall, this study has attempted to detect the indirect effect of skill-biased
technological change (SBTC) on inequality through changes in the rate of per capita
economic growth over the 1990s. The findings presented here, based upon MSA level
data from 1990 to 2000, suggest that 1) further work must be done to substantiate the
SBTC explanation for rising income inequality, 2) the effects oftechnological change
may have little or no impact on inequality through economic growth, 3) the original
Kuznets Curve Hypothesis appears to hold tnle even during periods of apparent structural
change in an advanced post-industrial economy, and 4) numerous additional factors not
identified by this study must be responsible for the variations in metropolitan household
income inequality over the decade in question. Future research may address these
challenges and questions through lines of inquiry similar to those suggested above.
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APPENDIX A
Table 7: Summary of regression coefficients estimating changes in the metropolitan
household Gini index, 1990-2000, including the direct effects of the measures of
technological change (standard errors are in parentheses, t-values in brackets)
y-intercept (constant)
% /). actual per capita real GMP 1990-2000

proportionate /). in educational inequality 1990-2000

point change in dissimilarity index 1990-2000

% /). in per capita total real transfer payments 1990-2000

/). in proportion of black population 1990-2000

Ll in ratio of female heads-of-household to population 1990-2000

/). in proportion of elderly population age 65+ 1990-2000

dummy for South census region

% population growth rate 1990-2000

% /). per capita utility patent approvals 1990-2000

/). in proportion of population in prof.! mgmt.! tech. jobs 19902000

F

R2
adjusted R2
n
*** significance level p < .01
** significance level p < .05
* significance level p < .10
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Model 6
.0243
-.0001
(.000)
[-1.475]
.0013***
(.000)
[2.632]
.0247*
(.013)
fI·925]
-.0001
(.000)
[-.416]
-.0004
(.001 )
[-.594]
.0011
(.003)
[.384]
.0010
(.001 )
[1.215]
.0008
(.002)
[.444]
-.0002***
(.000)
[-2.630]
-.0001
(.000)
[-.272]
-.0007
(.001)
[-.817]
3.343
.129
.091
260

Model 7
.0233

.0013***
(.000)
[2.683]
.0270**
(.013)
[2.120]
--.0001
(.000)
[-.612]
-.0004
(.001)
[-.561]
.0009
(.003)
[.298]
.0012
(.001)
[1.356]
.0008
(.002)
[.434]
-.0002**
(.000)
[-2.554]
-.0001
(.000)
[-.432]
-.0012
(.001)
[-1.578]
3.444
.122
.086
260

The primary focus of the present research is on the direct relationship between
technology-driven per capita economic growth and changes in household income
inequality, the growth-inequality relationship. If technological change is positively
associated with economic growth and is also a determinant of growing income inequality,
then we might expect a positive relationship between growth and changes in income
inequality. This study has shown otherwise, namely that economic growth tends to
moderately reduce (or at least restrain) income inequality when controlling for other
factors.
However, some curious readers may be interested in the direct impact ofthe
measures of technological change on the changes in household income inequality when
controlling for other factors. Table 7, above, is included as a satisfaction of this curiosity.
Model 6 is a repeat of Model 4 with the additional inclusion of the two measures of
technological change: per capita patent approval growth rates and change in the share of
MSA population in technical- and professional-sector occupations. Model 7 excludes the
per capita growth rate to determine if the measures of technological change play any role
in explaining changes in MSA household income inequality.
As both Models 6 and 7 reveal, the measures of technological change employed in
this study indicate no direct relationship with the changes in MSA household income
inequality from 1990 to 2000. Ifwe assume that these measures of technological change
are skill-biased, this finding further undermines the SBTC theory of widening income
inequality, at least at the metropolitan economy level. Further, as indicated in Model 6,
when the measures of technological change are included in the regression, the coefficient
on per capita economic growth rate fails the test of significance, indicating that the
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relationship between income inequality and per capita economic growth rates is highly
sensitive to the inclusion of these other variables, even though they are not themselves
significantly related to changes in household income inequality. As in the previous
findings highlighted in this research paper, both models exhibit relatively low R2 values,
indicating that much of the variation in household income inequality still remains
unexplained.
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